Root certificate · Microsec Ltd.
e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023
e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 is a root CA certificate operated by Microsec Ltd. (ECDSA P-521, valid until 2038-07-17, SHA-256 B4914150). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Not included Not included | No | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites
- EV policy OIDs
- not EV-enabled
- First included in
- 3.121 / 149
- Inclusion bug
- #1873057
Not included Apple
- Status
- Not included
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Microsec Ltd.
- Subject
- CN=e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023,2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU
- SHA-256
B49141502D00663D740F2E7EC340C52800962666121A36D09CF7DD2B90384FB4- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
6F9AD5D5DFE82CEBBE3707EE4F4F52582941D1FE- SPKI SHA-256
47487900A1BEB9EE08CCBC1116A8EC55F454B638994319F051B984023CED6423- Valid from
- 2023-07-17
- Expires
- 2038-07-17
- Key
- ECDSA P-521
- Signature algorithm
- ecdsa-with-SHA512
- Serial number
E86F187BD6396B984A49980A- Country
- HU
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
- Test websites
- valid:
https://eqtlsca2023-valid.e-szigno.hu· expired:https://eqtlsca2023-expired.e-szigno.hu· revoked:https://eqtlsca2023-revoked.e-szigno.hu - CCADB record
- A011387
- PEM
- microsec-e-szigno-tls-root-ca-2023.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 10 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023: 7 currently valid, 3 expired and 0 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 10 of 10: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025 | Microsec Ltd. | 2038-07-16 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2026 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-03-17 | Valid |
| e-Szigno OV TLS CA 2026 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-03-17 | Valid |
| e-Szigno DV TLS CA 2026 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-03-17 | Valid |
| e-Szigno DV TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-05-29 | Valid |
| e-Szigno OV TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-05-29 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-05-29 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2026-07-18 | Expired |
| e-Szigno OV TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2026-07-18 | Expired |
| e-Szigno DV TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2026-07-18 | Expired |
Cross-signed versions
1 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023, can still build a chain.
| Signed by | CA owner | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 crt.sh | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-30 | Valid |
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://crl.e-szigno.hu/tlsrootca2023.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 7 valid intermediates signed by e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://tlsrootca2023-crl.e-szigno.hu/tlsrootca2023.crl(7) - OCSP:
http://tlsrootca2023-ocsp.e-szigno.hu(7)
What happens when it expires
e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 is valid until 2038-07-17, about 11.7 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 by common name (e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Not included)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: B49141502D00663D740F2E7EC340C52800962666121A36D09CF7DD2B90384FB4Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root 6F9AD5D5DFE82CEBBE3707EE4F4F52582941D1FELinux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023"Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "B4:91:41:50:2D:00:66:3D:74:0F:2E:7E:C3:40:C5:28:00:96:26:66:12:1A:36:D0:9C:F7:DD:2B:90:38:4F:B4"Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Microsec Ltd. → e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in microsec-e-szigno-tls-root-ca-2023.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=B4:91:41:50:2D:00:66:3D:74:0F:2E:7E:C3:40:C5:28:00:96:26:66:12:1A:36:D0:9C:F7:DD:2B:90:38:4F:B4FAQ
Is e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not.
When does e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 expire?
On 2038-07-17, about 11.7 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 issued?
The CCADB lists 10: 7 valid, 3 expired and 0 revoked. The newest valid one is e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025, valid until 2038-07-16.
Is e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 cross-signed?
Yes. The CCADB has 1 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009; 1 of them are still valid.
Other roots from Microsec Ltd.
- e-Szigno Root CA 2017 ECDSA P-256 · 2042-08-22
- Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 RSA 2048 · 2029-12-30
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV