Root certificate · Microsec Ltd.
e-Szigno Root CA 2017
e-Szigno Root CA 2017 is a root CA certificate operated by Microsec Ltd. (ECDSA P-256, valid until 2042-08-22, SHA-256 BEB00B30). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | 2026-09-30 | Yes |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Not included Not included | No | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-09-30 (sct_not_after). The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for e-Szigno Root CA 2017.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
- Distrust for TLS after
- 2026-09-30
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites, Email
- EV policy OIDs
- not EV-enabled
- First included in
- NSS 3.54 / Firefox 79
- Inclusion bug
- #1445364
Not included Apple
- Status
- Not included
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Microsec Ltd.
- Subject
- CN=e-Szigno Root CA 2017,2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU
- SHA-256
BEB00B30839B9BC32C32E4447905950641F26421B15ED089198B518AE2EA1B99- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
89D483034F9E9A48805F7237D4A9A6EFCB7C1FD1- SPKI SHA-256
42431627EA76CC78697F915E3455B1B2EC82FF2F6380EE6423EF3C0840B7E631- Valid from
- 2017-08-22
- Expires
- 2042-08-22
- Key
- ECDSA P-256
- Signature algorithm
- ecdsa-with-SHA256
- Serial number
15448EF21FD97590DF5040A- Country
- HU
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
- Test websites
- valid:
https://eqtlsca2018-valid.e-szigno.hu· expired:https://eqtlsca2018-expired.e-szigno.hu· revoked:https://eqtlsca2018-revoked.e-szigno.hu - CCADB record
- A006033
- PEM
- microsec-e-szigno-root-ca-2017.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 23 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by e-Szigno Root CA 2017: 18 currently valid, 0 expired and 5 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 20 of 23: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| e-Szigno TSA CA 2026 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-21 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified SMIME CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-21 | Valid |
| e-Szigno SMIME CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-21 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class2 CodeSigning CA 2020 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno TSA CA 2020 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class3 CodeSigning CA 2020 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2018 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class3 SSL CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno TSA CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Online SSL CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Pseudonymous CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified QCP CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class3 CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class2 CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class2 SSL CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified Pseudonymous CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified Organization CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class2 CodeSigning CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Revoked |
| e-Szigno Class3 CodeSigning CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2042-08-22 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as e-Szigno Root CA 2017 with a different issuer, so a client has to carry e-Szigno Root CA 2017 itself in its root store to trust it.
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
e-Szigno Root CA 2017 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://crl.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 18 valid intermediates signed by e-Szigno Root CA 2017; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://rootca2017-crl1.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl(17) - CRL:
http://rootca2017-crl2.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl(17) - CRL:
http://rootca2017-crl3.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl(17) - CRL:
http://rootca2017-crl.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl(1) - OCSP:
http://rootca2017-ocsp1.e-szigno.hu(17) - OCSP:
http://rootca2017-ocsp2.e-szigno.hu(17) - OCSP:
http://rootca2017-ocsp3.e-szigno.hu(17) - OCSP:
http://rootca2017-ocsp.e-szigno.hu(1)
What happens when it expires
e-Szigno Root CA 2017 is valid until 2042-08-22, about 15.8 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-09-30.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up e-Szigno Root CA 2017 by common name (e-Szigno Root CA 2017) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Not included)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: BEB00B30839B9BC32C32E4447905950641F26421B15ED089198B518AE2EA1B99
Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root 89D483034F9E9A48805F7237D4A9A6EFCB7C1FD1
Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "e-Szigno Root CA 2017"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "e-Szigno Root CA 2017"
Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "BE:B0:0B:30:83:9B:9B:C3:2C:32:E4:44:79:05:95:06:41:F2:64:21:B1:5E:D0:89:19:8B:51:8A:E2:EA:1B:99"
Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Microsec Ltd. → e-Szigno Root CA 2017.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in microsec-e-szigno-root-ca-2017.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=BE:B0:0B:30:83:9B:9B:C3:2C:32:E4:44:79:05:95:06:41:F2:64:21:B1:5E:D0:89:19:8B:51:8A:E2:EA:1B:99
FAQ
Is e-Szigno Root CA 2017 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-09-30.
When does e-Szigno Root CA 2017 expire?
On 2042-08-22, about 15.8 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has e-Szigno Root CA 2017 issued?
The CCADB lists 23: 18 valid, 0 expired and 5 revoked. The newest valid one is e-Szigno TSA CA 2026, valid until 2042-08-21.
Is e-Szigno Root CA 2017 cross-signed?
No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.
Other roots from Microsec Ltd.
- e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 ECDSA P-521 · 2038-07-17
- Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 RSA 2048 · 2029-12-30
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV