Root certificate · Microsec Ltd.

e-Szigno Root CA 2017

e-Szigno Root CA 2017 is a root CA certificate operated by Microsec Ltd. (ECDSA P-256, valid until 2042-08-22, SHA-256 BEB00B30). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes2026-09-30Yes
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleNot included Not includedNo—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—No

Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-09-30 (sct_not_after). The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for e-Szigno Root CA 2017.

Included Chrome

Status
Included
Distrust for TLS after
2026-09-30

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites, Email
EV policy OIDs
not EV-enabled
First included in
NSS 3.54 / Firefox 79
Inclusion bug
#1445364

Not included Apple

Status
Not included

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
Microsec Ltd.
Subject
CN=e-Szigno Root CA 2017,2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU
SHA-256
BEB00B30839B9BC32C32E4447905950641F26421B15ED089198B518AE2EA1B99
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
89D483034F9E9A48805F7237D4A9A6EFCB7C1FD1
SPKI SHA-256
42431627EA76CC78697F915E3455B1B2EC82FF2F6380EE6423EF3C0840B7E631
Valid from
2017-08-22
Expires
2042-08-22
Key
ECDSA P-256
Signature algorithm
ecdsa-with-SHA256
Serial number
15448EF21FD97590DF5040A
Country
HU
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites
valid: https://eqtlsca2018-valid.e-szigno.hu · expired: https://eqtlsca2018-expired.e-szigno.hu · revoked: https://eqtlsca2018-revoked.e-szigno.hu
CCADB record
A006033
PEM
microsec-e-szigno-root-ca-2017.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 23 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by e-Szigno Root CA 2017: 18 currently valid, 0 expired and 5 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 20 of 23: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
e-Szigno TSA CA 2026 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-21Valid
e-Szigno Qualified SMIME CA 2023 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-21Valid
e-Szigno SMIME CA 2023 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-21Valid
e-Szigno Class2 CodeSigning CA 2020 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno TSA CA 2020 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Class3 CodeSigning CA 2020 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2018 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Class3 SSL CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno TSA CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Online SSL CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Pseudonymous CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Qualified QCP CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Qualified CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Class3 CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Class2 CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Class2 SSL CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Qualified Pseudonymous CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Qualified Organization CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Valid
e-Szigno Class2 CodeSigning CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Revoked
e-Szigno Class3 CodeSigning CA 2017 Microsec Ltd.2042-08-22Revoked

Cross-signed versions

No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as e-Szigno Root CA 2017 with a different issuer, so a client has to carry e-Szigno Root CA 2017 itself in its root store to trust it.

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

e-Szigno Root CA 2017 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://crl.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 18 valid intermediates signed by e-Szigno Root CA 2017; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://rootca2017-crl1.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl (17)
  • CRL: http://rootca2017-crl2.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl (17)
  • CRL: http://rootca2017-crl3.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl (17)
  • CRL: http://rootca2017-crl.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl (1)
  • OCSP: http://rootca2017-ocsp1.e-szigno.hu (17)
  • OCSP: http://rootca2017-ocsp2.e-szigno.hu (17)
  • OCSP: http://rootca2017-ocsp3.e-szigno.hu (17)
  • OCSP: http://rootca2017-ocsp.e-szigno.hu (1)

What happens when it expires

e-Szigno Root CA 2017 is valid until 2042-08-22, about 15.8 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-09-30.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up e-Szigno Root CA 2017 by common name (e-Szigno Root CA 2017) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Not included)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: BEB00B30839B9BC32C32E4447905950641F26421B15ED089198B518AE2EA1B99

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root 89D483034F9E9A48805F7237D4A9A6EFCB7C1FD1

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "e-Szigno Root CA 2017"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "e-Szigno Root CA 2017"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "BE:B0:0B:30:83:9B:9B:C3:2C:32:E4:44:79:05:95:06:41:F2:64:21:B1:5E:D0:89:19:8B:51:8A:E2:EA:1B:99"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Microsec Ltd. → e-Szigno Root CA 2017.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in microsec-e-szigno-root-ca-2017.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=BE:B0:0B:30:83:9B:9B:C3:2C:32:E4:44:79:05:95:06:41:F2:64:21:B1:5E:D0:89:19:8B:51:8A:E2:EA:1B:99

FAQ

Is e-Szigno Root CA 2017 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-09-30.

When does e-Szigno Root CA 2017 expire?

On 2042-08-22, about 15.8 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has e-Szigno Root CA 2017 issued?

The CCADB lists 23: 18 valid, 0 expired and 5 revoked. The newest valid one is e-Szigno TSA CA 2026, valid until 2042-08-21.

Is e-Szigno Root CA 2017 cross-signed?

No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.

Other roots from Microsec Ltd.

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV