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Timelines

Root program changes: CA distrust and browser trust policy timeline

Browsers decide which CAs your users trust. This timeline lists root program decisions with their exact cut-off dates: CA distrust events, Certificate Transparency and MPIC requirements, and Chrome's move to dedicated TLS server-authentication hierarchies.

Last verified Status as of November 10, 2026

Timeline

  1. In effect

    Chrome 66 distrusts older Symantec certificates

    Chrome 66 stopped trusting certificates from Symantec's legacy PKI (including Thawte, GeoTrust and RapidSSL brands) that were issued before June 1, 2016.

    Who is affected: Sites still using Symantec-issued certificates from before mid-2016.

    Source: Google Security Blog: Chrome's Plan to Distrust Symantec Certificates

  2. In effect

    Chrome requires Certificate Transparency

    Publicly trusted TLS certificates issued after April 30, 2018 must be logged to Certificate Transparency logs, with SCTs delivered to the browser, or Chrome rejects them (enforced from Chrome 68).

    Who is affected: All public CAs; private-CA certificates are not affected.

    Source: Chromium ct-policy: Certificate Transparency enforcement in Chrome

  3. In effect

    Apple requires Certificate Transparency

    Apple platforms require TLS certificates issued after October 15, 2018 by system-trusted CAs to be logged to CT.

    Who is affected: Public CAs and sites serving Safari and iOS users.

    Source: Apple Platform Security: TLS security

  4. In effect

    Chrome 70 fully distrusts Symantec's old PKI

    Chrome 70 stopped trusting all certificates from Symantec's legacy infrastructure, regardless of issuance date. Symantec's CA business had been sold to DigiCert, which reissued certificates from its own roots.

    Who is affected: Any site still on a legacy Symantec, Thawte, GeoTrust or RapidSSL chain.

    Source: Google Security Blog: Chrome's Plan to Distrust Symantec Certificates

  5. In effect

    Browsers disable TLS 1.0 and 1.1

    Firefox 78 (June 30, 2020), Chrome 84 and Edge 84 (July 2020) disabled TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 by default. RFC 8996 formally deprecated both versions in March 2021.

    Who is affected: Servers and appliances that could not negotiate TLS 1.2; they now show [ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH](error:err-ssl-version-or-cipher-mismatch).

    Source: Chrome 84 deprecations and removals · Mozilla Hacks: It's the Boot for TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 · Microsoft Edge Blog: TLS 1.0 and 1.1 schedule update

  6. In effect

    TrustCor distrusted

    Mozilla set a distrust-after date of November 30, 2022 for TrustCor roots and later removed them; Chrome removed TrustCor from its trust store in Chrome 111 (March 2023).

    Who is affected: Customers of TrustCor-issued TLS certificates.

    Source: Mozilla Bugzilla 1803453: TrustCor distrust · Google Security Blog: Sustaining Digital Certificate Security - TrustCor

  7. In effect

    OCSP optional, CRLs mandatory (Ballot SC-063)

    Publicly trusted CAs must publish CRLs; OCSP became optional. This opened the way for CAs such as Let's Encrypt to shut down OCSP.

    Who is affected: CAs, and clients that relied only on OCSP for revocation checks.

    Source: CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC-063v4 · Chrome Root Program: Moving Forward, Together

  8. In effect

    Entrust TLS certificates distrusted

    Chrome 131 and later stopped trusting TLS certificates chaining to nine Entrust and AffirmTrust roots whose earliest SCT is after November 11, 2024. Apple's cut-off was November 15, 2024 and Mozilla's November 30, 2024. Certificates issued earlier keep working until they expire.

    Who is affected: Sites with Entrust TLS certificates issued after the cut-off dates.

    Source: Google Security Blog: Sustaining Digital Certificate Security - Entrust Certificate Distrust · Mozilla dev-security-policy: Entrust distrust decision · Apple Support: Entrust certificate distrust

  9. In effect

    Sectigo acquires Entrust's public certificate business

    Sectigo announced it had acquired Entrust's public certificate business; new publicly trusted certificates for those customers are issued from Sectigo hierarchies.

    Who is affected: Existing Entrust public TLS customers.

    Source: Sectigo: Sectigo acquires Entrust public certificate business

  10. In effect

    Multi-perspective validation (MPIC) required

    CAs must repeat domain validation and CAA checks from at least 2 remote network perspectives (MPIC). Quorum became mandatory on September 15, 2025; at least 3 perspectives across 2 regional internet registries were required from March 15, 2026 and at least 4 from June 15, 2026.

    Who is affected: Sites that firewall or geo-block validation traffic, which can make [HTTP-01](term:http-01) validation fail.

    Source: CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC-067v3 (MPIC) · CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements

  11. In effect

    Chrome distrusts Chunghwa Telecom and NetLock

    Chrome 139 and later do not trust new TLS certificates chaining to Chunghwa Telecom and NetLock roots whose earliest SCT is after July 31, 2025 (announced May 30, 2025).

    Who is affected: Sites using certificates from these two CAs, mainly in Taiwan and Hungary.

    Source: Google: Sustaining digital certificate security - Chrome Root Store changes

  12. In effect

    First 15-year root removals (keys from 2006–2007)

    Under Chrome's root term limit, roots whose key material was generated in 2006–2007 were scheduled for removal around April 15, 2026. DigiCert reports that Chrome and Mozilla removed its G1 roots on this date.

    Who is affected: Sites still served from older roots such as DigiCert's G1 hierarchy.

    Source: Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8 · DigiCert: Root strategy aligning with industry standards

  13. In effect

    Chrome: dedicated TLS hierarchies and pre-issuance CT logging

    Chrome begins phasing out PKI hierarchies that are not dedicated to TLS server authentication. Subordinate CAs disclosed to CCADB from this date must assert only the serverAuth EKU, and all TLS precertificates must be logged to at least one Chrome-recognised CT log before issuance. Leaf certificates are not distrusted for containing clientAuth on this date.

    Who is affected: Public CAs; organisations that relied on public TLS certificates for client authentication should plan a move to a private CA.

    Source: Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8

  14. In effect

    Chrome removes three non-dedicated DigiCert roots

    According to DigiCert, Chrome removed DigiCert Assured ID Root G2, Assured ID Root G3 and Trusted Root G4 because they are not dedicated TLS roots. TLS certificates issued from them before July 1, 2026 remain trusted until they expire.

    Who is affected: DigiCert customers whose certificates chained to these roots.

    Source: DigiCert: Google Chrome root removal (Trusted Root G4, Assured ID Root G2/G3)

  15. In effect

    Compromised eMudhra intermediates; emSign ECC Root CA - G3 removed

    Google and Mozilla confirmed that eMudhra subordinate CAs had been compromised (Google describes eight). The affected intermediates were blocked, and Chrome removed emSign ECC Root CA - G3, rolling out to devices on October 27, 2026. Apple blocked the same root on October 23, 2026.

    Who is affected: Sites with certificates chaining to eMudhra / emSign roots.

    Source: Google: Protecting Chrome and Android users from compromised eMudhra intermediate CA certificates · Mozilla dev-security-policy: eMudhra incident · Apple Support: eMudhra certificates blocked

  16. Upcoming

    DigiCert issues from its G5 TLS roots by default

    DigiCert plans to make DigiCert TLS RSA4096 Root G5 and DigiCert TLS ECC P384 Root G5 its default issuing hierarchies (postponed from October 15, 2026).

    Who is affected: DigiCert customers and clients with custom trust stores that may lack the G5 roots.

    Source: DigiCert: Root strategy aligning with industry standards

  17. Upcoming

    Chrome stops trusting new emSign Root CA - G1 certificates

    Chrome 153 and later will not trust certificates chaining to emSign Root CA - G1 whose earliest SCT is after November 16, 2026, 23:59:59 UTC.

    Who is affected: Sites with certificates chaining to emSign Root CA - G1; switch CAs before renewing.

    Source: Google: Protecting Chrome and Android users from compromised eMudhra intermediate CA certificates

  18. Upcoming

    MPIC: at least 5 remote perspectives

    The last MPIC phase requires CAs to corroborate domain validation and CAA from at least 5 remote network perspectives, at least 500 km apart.

    Who is affected: Sites with strict inbound firewall rules on validation paths.

    Source: CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements

  19. Upcoming

    Chrome: leaf certificates must be serverAuth-only

    Subscriber certificates issued on or after March 15, 2027 that chain to the Chrome Root Store must include the EKU extension with serverAuth only. Subordinate CAs must also be integrated with an automation solution.

    Who is affected: Anyone still ordering public TLS certificates with clientAuth; move client authentication to a [private CA](term:private-ca).

    Source: Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8

  20. Upcoming

    Next 15-year root removals (keys from 2008–2009)

    Roots whose key material was generated in 2008–2009 are scheduled for removal from the Chrome Root Store around April 15, 2027.

    Who is affected: Customers of CAs still issuing from roots of that age.

    Source: Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8

  21. Upcoming

    At most two roots per CA owner in Chrome

    The Chrome Root Store will include at most two root certificates per CA owner, pushing CAs to consolidate on new dedicated TLS roots.

    Who is affected: CAs with many legacy roots, and clients that pin specific roots.

    Source: Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8

FAQ

What happens to my certificate when browsers distrust its CA?

Distrust is usually tied to a date: certificates issued (or first logged to CT) before the cut-off keep working until they expire, and newer ones fail with errors such as NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID. Replace the certificate with one from another CA before your next renewal.

Does Chrome distrust certificates with the clientAuth EKU from June 15, 2026?

No. Chrome Root Program Policy 1.8 requires subordinate CAs disclosed from June 15, 2026 to be serverAuth-only and starts phasing out non-dedicated hierarchies on that date; the serverAuth-only rule for subscriber (leaf) certificates applies to certificates issued from March 15, 2027. Many CAs, including Let's Encrypt, dropped clientAuth earlier.

How do I find out which root my certificate chains to?

Run your domain through the SSL Checker, or use openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -showcerts and look at the issuer of the last certificate in the chain.

Why does Chrome remove roots that are 15 years old?

Old root keys have been exposed to more risk and were often created under weaker rules. Chrome's policy removes roots whose key material is more than 15 years old on a published schedule, so CAs have to rotate to newer, dedicated TLS roots.

Sources

  1. Google Security Blog: Chrome's Plan to Distrust Symantec Certificates
  2. Chromium ct-policy: Certificate Transparency enforcement in Chrome
  3. Apple Platform Security: TLS security
  4. Chrome 84 deprecations and removals
  5. Mozilla Hacks: It's the Boot for TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
  6. Microsoft Edge Blog: TLS 1.0 and 1.1 schedule update
  7. Mozilla Bugzilla 1803453: TrustCor distrust
  8. Google Security Blog: Sustaining Digital Certificate Security - TrustCor
  9. CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC-063v4
  10. Chrome Root Program: Moving Forward, Together
  11. Google Security Blog: Sustaining Digital Certificate Security - Entrust Certificate Distrust
  12. Mozilla dev-security-policy: Entrust distrust decision
  13. Apple Support: Entrust certificate distrust
  14. Sectigo: Sectigo acquires Entrust public certificate business
  15. CA/Browser Forum Ballot SC-067v3 (MPIC)
  16. CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements
  17. Google: Sustaining digital certificate security - Chrome Root Store changes
  18. Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8
  19. DigiCert: Root strategy aligning with industry standards
  20. DigiCert: Google Chrome root removal (Trusted Root G4, Assured ID Root G2/G3)
  21. Google: Protecting Chrome and Android users from compromised eMudhra intermediate CA certificates
  22. Mozilla dev-security-policy: eMudhra incident
  23. Apple Support: eMudhra certificates blocked