Root certificate · Microsec Ltd.
Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009
Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 is a root CA certificate operated by Microsec Ltd. (RSA 2048, valid until 2029-12-30, SHA-256 3C5F81FE). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | 2026-09-30 | Yes |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-09-30 (sct_not_after). The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
- Distrust for TLS after
- 2026-09-30
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites, Email
- EV policy OIDs
- not EV-enabled
- First included in
- NSS 3.12.8 / Firefox 3.6.12
- Inclusion bug
- #510506
Included Apple
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Encrypting File System, IP Security Tunnel Termination, IP Security User, Secure Email, Time Stamping
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Microsec Ltd.
- Subject
- 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=info@e-szigno.hu,CN=Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009,O=Microsec Ltd.,L=Budapest,C=HU
- SHA-256
3C5F81FEA5FAB82C64BFA2EAECAFCDE8E077FC8620A7CAE537163DF36EDBF378- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
89DF74FE5CF40F4A80F9E3377D54DA91E101318E- SPKI SHA-256
616167201433AEA6C8E5E3070AFCAF6749188F814BD1ABB179AE8DAD3ABF26EC- Valid from
- 2009-06-16
- Expires
- 2029-12-30
- Key
- RSA 2048
- Signature algorithm
- sha256WithRSAEncryption
- Serial number
C27E43044E473F19- Country
- HU
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Encrypting File System, Time Stamping, IP Security Tunnel Termination, IP Security User
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
- Test websites
- valid:
https://qtlsca2018-valid.e-szigno.hu/· expired:https://qtlsca2018-expired.e-szigno.hu/· revoked:https://qtlsca2018-revoked.e-szigno.hu/ - CCADB record
- A000164
- PEM
- microsec-e-szigno-root-ca-2009.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 54 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009: 33 currently valid, 9 expired and 12 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked). 1 of the valid ones run past the expiry date of the root itself (2029-12-30).
Showing 20 of 54: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 → e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-30 | Valid |
| e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-30 | Valid |
| e-Szigno SMIME CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno OV TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class2 SSL CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Class3 SSL CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified SMIME CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Online SSL CA 2017 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno DV TLS CA 2023 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2018 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-02-12 | Valid |
| e-Szigno OV TLS CA 2025 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-01-05 | Valid |
| e-Szigno DV TLS CA 2025 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-01-05 | Valid |
| e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2025 | Microsec Ltd. | 2028-01-05 | Valid |
| e-Szigno TSA CA 2020 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-09-29 | Valid |
| Qualified KET e-Szigno CA 2018 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-29 | Valid |
| Class3 KET e-Szigno CA 2018 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-29 | Valid |
| Qualified e-Szigno TLS CA 2018 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-29 | Valid |
| Advanced Code Signing Class2 e-Szigno CA 2016 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-29 | Valid |
| Qualified e-Szigno Organization CA 2016 | Microsec Ltd. | 2029-12-29 | Valid |
Cross-signed versions
No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 with a different issuer, so a client has to carry Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 itself in its root store to trust it.
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://crl.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 33 valid intermediates signed by Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://crl.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl(20) - CRL:
http://rootca2009-crl1.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl(11) - CRL:
http://rootca2009-crl2.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl(11) - CRL:
http://rootca2009-crl3.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl(11) - OCSP:
http://rootocsp2009.e-szigno.hu(20) - OCSP:
http://rootca2009-ocsp1.e-szigno.hu(11) - OCSP:
http://rootca2009-ocsp2.e-szigno.hu(11) - OCSP:
http://rootca2009-ocsp3.e-szigno.hu(11)
What happens when it expires
Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 is valid until 2029-12-30, about 3.1 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. 1 of its valid intermediates expire later than the root, so their operators need another path, such as a cross-sign from a newer root, before 2029-12-30. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-09-30.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 by common name (Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 3C5F81FEA5FAB82C64BFA2EAECAFCDE8E077FC8620A7CAE537163DF36EDBF378Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root 89DF74FE5CF40F4A80F9E3377D54DA91E101318ELinux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009"Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "3C:5F:81:FE:A5:FA:B8:2C:64:BF:A2:EA:EC:AF:CD:E8:E0:77:FC:86:20:A7:CA:E5:37:16:3D:F3:6E:DB:F3:78"Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Microsec Ltd. → Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in microsec-e-szigno-root-ca-2009.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=3C:5F:81:FE:A5:FA:B8:2C:64:BF:A2:EA:EC:AF:CD:E8:E0:77:FC:86:20:A7:CA:E5:37:16:3D:F3:6E:DB:F3:78FAQ
Is Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-09-30.
When does Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 expire?
On 2029-12-30, about 3.1 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot. 1 of the valid ones run past the expiry date of the root itself (2029-12-30).
How many intermediate certificates has Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 issued?
The CCADB lists 54: 33 valid, 9 expired and 12 revoked. The newest valid one is e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023, valid until 2029-12-30.
Is Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009 cross-signed?
No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.
Other roots from Microsec Ltd.
- e-Szigno Root CA 2017 ECDSA P-256 · 2042-08-22
- e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023 ECDSA P-521 · 2038-07-17
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV