Root certificate · Deutsche Telekom Security
Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020
Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 is a root CA certificate operated by Deutsche Telekom Security (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2045-08-25, SHA-256 578AF4DE). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | 2027-08-30 | Yes |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Not included Not included | No | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2027-08-30 (sct_not_after). Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.23.140.1.1.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
- Distrust for TLS after
- 2027-08-30
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites
- EV policy OIDs
- 2.23.140.1.1
- First included in
- NSS 3.98 / Firefox 124
- Inclusion bug
- #1820592
Not included Apple
- Status
- Not included
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
- Subject
- CN=Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020,O=Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH,C=DE
- SHA-256
578AF4DED0853F4E5998DB4AEAF9CBEA8D945F60B620A38D1A3C13B2BC7BA8E1- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
C0F896C5A93B01062107DA184248BCE99D88D5EC- SPKI SHA-256
EAB0DE5A46419010B01B2D55553FC111AA82B43D9395EDFEAEAA8C76E6AD1995- Valid from
- 2020-08-25
- Expires
- 2045-08-25
- Key
- ECDSA P-384
- Signature algorithm
- ecdsa-with-SHA384
- Serial number
363A968CC95CB258CDD0015DC5E55700- Country
- DE
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- 2.23.140.1.1 · TLS EV capable: Yes
- Test websites
- valid:
https://active.tstlser20.test.telesec.de/· expired:https://expired.tstlser20.test.telesec.de/· revoked:https://revoked.tstlser20.test.telesec.de/ - CCADB record
- A010819
- PEM
- telekom-security-tls-ecc-root-2020.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 7 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020: 6 currently valid, 0 expired and 1 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 7 of 7: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telekom Security OV ECC CA 26 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2029-03-18 | Valid |
| Telekom Security OV ECC qualified CA 25 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2035-10-22 | Valid |
| Telekom Security EV ECC CA 24 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2034-11-25 | Valid |
| Telekom Security DV ECC CA 24 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2034-11-25 | Valid |
| Telekom Security OV ECC CA 24 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2034-11-25 | Valid |
| Telekom Security EV ECC CA 21 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2031-04-21 | Valid |
| Telekom Security OV ECC qCA 25 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2035-07-07 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
1 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020, can still build a chain.
| Signed by | CA owner | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3 crt.sh | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Valid |
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://tstlser20.crl.telesec.de/rl/Telekom_Security_TLS_ECC_Root_2020.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 6 valid intermediates signed by Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://tstlser20.crl.telesec.de/rl/Telekom_Security_TLS_ECC_Root_2020.crl(6) - OCSP:
http://tstlser20.ocsp.telesec.de/ocspr(6)
What happens when it expires
Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 is valid until 2045-08-25, about 18.8 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2027-08-30.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 by common name (Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Not included)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 578AF4DED0853F4E5998DB4AEAF9CBEA8D945F60B620A38D1A3C13B2BC7BA8E1Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root C0F896C5A93B01062107DA184248BCE99D88D5ECLinux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020"Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "57:8A:F4:DE:D0:85:3F:4E:59:98:DB:4A:EA:F9:CB:EA:8D:94:5F:60:B6:20:A3:8D:1A:3C:13:B2:BC:7B:A8:E1"Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH → Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in telekom-security-tls-ecc-root-2020.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=57:8A:F4:DE:D0:85:3F:4E:59:98:DB:4A:EA:F9:CB:EA:8D:94:5F:60:B6:20:A3:8D:1A:3C:13:B2:BC:7B:A8:E1FAQ
Is Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2027-08-30.
When does Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 expire?
On 2045-08-25, about 18.8 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 issued?
The CCADB lists 7: 6 valid, 0 expired and 1 revoked. The newest valid one is Telekom Security OV ECC CA 26, valid until 2029-03-18.
Is Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 cross-signed?
Yes. The CCADB has 1 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3; 1 of them are still valid.
Other roots from Deutsche Telekom Security
- T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 RSA 2048 · 2033-10-01
- T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3 RSA 2048 · 2033-10-01
- Telekom Security TLS RSA Root 2023 RSA 4096 · 2048-03-27
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV