Root certificate · Deutsche Telekom Security

T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2

T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 is a root CA certificate operated by Deutsche Telekom Security (RSA 2048, valid until 2033-10-01, SHA-256 91E2F578). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes2026-05-28Yes
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleIncluded IncludedYes—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—No

Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-05-28 (sct_not_after). The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2.

Included Chrome

Status
Included
Distrust for TLS after
2026-05-28

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites, Email
EV policy OIDs
not EV-enabled
First included in
NSS 3.16 / Firefox 29
Inclusion bug
#892390

Included Apple

Status
Included
Trust bits
serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
Subject
CN=T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2,OU=T-Systems Trust Center,O=T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH,C=DE
SHA-256
91E2F5788D5810EBA7BA58737DE1548A8ECACD014598BC0B143E041B17052552
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
590D2D7D884F402E617EA562321765CF17D894E9
SPKI SHA-256
6106C0E3A0A299831875127BD7D3CC1859803D511CAC11EB6E0840DD166FC10E
Valid from
2008-10-01
Expires
2033-10-01
Key
RSA 2048
Signature algorithm
sha256WithRSAEncryption
Serial number
1
Country
DE
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites
valid: https://root-class2.test.telesec.de/ · expired: https://root-class2-expired.test.telesec.de/ · revoked: https://root-class2-revoked.test.telesec.de/
CCADB record
A000220
PEM
telekom-security-t-telesec-globalroot-class-2.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 32 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2: 14 currently valid, 3 expired and 15 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 20 of 32: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
Telekom Security SMIME ECC Root 2021 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-09-30Valid
Telekom Security SMIME RSA Root 2023 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-09-30Valid
Deutsche Telekom SMIME qualified CA 25 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-09-30Valid
Telekom Security OV qualified CA 25 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-09-30Valid
Telekom Security SMIME CA 25 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-09-30Valid
Deutsche Telekom AG secure email CA E05 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2028-08-08Valid
Telekom Security BusinessID SMIME CA 2023 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-06-19Valid
Telekom Security ServerID OV Class 2 CA Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2027-08-02Valid
Telekom Security OV RSA CA 22 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2032-06-21Valid
TeleSec Business TLS-CA 2022 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2032-06-21Valid
Telekom Security DV RSA CA 22 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2032-02-22Valid
TeleSec Business CA 21 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2031-11-17Valid
Deutsche Telekom AG secure email CA E03 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2030-07-09Valid
DFN-Verein Certification Authority 2 DFN-Verein2031-02-22Valid
TeleSec ServerPass Class 2 CA Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2024-02-11Expired
TeleSec Business CA 1 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2024-11-29Expired
T-TeleSec GlobalCA Class 2 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2018-10-01Expired
Telekom Security OV qCA 25 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-09-30Revoked
Telekom Security SMIME qCA 25 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2033-09-30Revoked
Deutsche Telekom AG secure email CA E04 Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2028-06-19Revoked

Cross-signed versions

2 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2, can still build a chain.

Signed byCA ownerExpiresStatus
Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2 crt.sh Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2018-10-01Expired
Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2 crt.sh Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH2019-07-09Expired

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://pki.telesec.de/rl/GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 14 valid intermediates signed by T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://grcl2.crl.telesec.de/rl/T-TeleSec_GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl (11)
  • CRL: http://crl-cpki.telekom.de/rl/GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl (1)
  • CRL: http://crl-cpki.telekom.de/rl/T-TeleSec_GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl (1)
  • CRL: http://pki0336.telesec.de/rl/TeleSec_GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl (1)
  • CRL: ldap://ldap-cpki.telekom.de/CN=T-TeleSec%20GlobalRoot%20Class%202,OU=T-TeleSec%20Trust%20Center,O=T-Systems%20Enterprise%20Services%20GmbH,C=DE?authorityRevocationList (1)
  • OCSP: http://grcl2.ocsp.telesec.de/ocspr (11)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp.telekom.de/ocspr (2)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp0336.telesec.de/ocspr (1)

What happens when it expires

T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 is valid until 2033-10-01, about 6.9 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-05-28.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 by common name (T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 91E2F5788D5810EBA7BA58737DE1548A8ECACD014598BC0B143E041B17052552

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root 590D2D7D884F402E617EA562321765CF17D894E9

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "91:E2:F5:78:8D:58:10:EB:A7:BA:58:73:7D:E1:54:8A:8E:CA:CD:01:45:98:BC:0B:14:3E:04:1B:17:05:25:52"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH → T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in telekom-security-t-telesec-globalroot-class-2.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=91:E2:F5:78:8D:58:10:EB:A7:BA:58:73:7D:E1:54:8A:8E:CA:CD:01:45:98:BC:0B:14:3E:04:1B:17:05:25:52

FAQ

Is T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-05-28.

When does T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 expire?

On 2033-10-01, about 6.9 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 issued?

The CCADB lists 32: 14 valid, 3 expired and 15 revoked. The newest valid one is Telekom Security SMIME ECC Root 2021, valid until 2033-09-30.

Is T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 cross-signed?

Yes. The CCADB has 2 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2; 0 of them are still valid.

Other roots from Deutsche Telekom Security

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV