Root certificate · Deutsche Telekom Security
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 is a root CA certificate operated by Deutsche Telekom Security (RSA 2048, valid until 2033-10-01, SHA-256 91E2F578). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | 2026-05-28 | Yes |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-05-28 (sct_not_after). The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
- Distrust for TLS after
- 2026-05-28
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites, Email
- EV policy OIDs
- not EV-enabled
- First included in
- NSS 3.16 / Firefox 29
- Inclusion bug
- #892390
Included Apple
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH
- Subject
- CN=T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2,OU=T-Systems Trust Center,O=T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH,C=DE
- SHA-256
91E2F5788D5810EBA7BA58737DE1548A8ECACD014598BC0B143E041B17052552- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
590D2D7D884F402E617EA562321765CF17D894E9- SPKI SHA-256
6106C0E3A0A299831875127BD7D3CC1859803D511CAC11EB6E0840DD166FC10E- Valid from
- 2008-10-01
- Expires
- 2033-10-01
- Key
- RSA 2048
- Signature algorithm
- sha256WithRSAEncryption
- Serial number
1- Country
- DE
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
- Test websites
- valid:
https://root-class2.test.telesec.de/· expired:https://root-class2-expired.test.telesec.de/· revoked:https://root-class2-revoked.test.telesec.de/ - CCADB record
- A000220
- PEM
- telekom-security-t-telesec-globalroot-class-2.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 32 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2: 14 currently valid, 3 expired and 15 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 20 of 32: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telekom Security SMIME ECC Root 2021 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Valid |
| Telekom Security SMIME RSA Root 2023 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Valid |
| Deutsche Telekom SMIME qualified CA 25 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Valid |
| Telekom Security OV qualified CA 25 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Valid |
| Telekom Security SMIME CA 25 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Valid |
| Deutsche Telekom AG secure email CA E05 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2028-08-08 | Valid |
| Telekom Security BusinessID SMIME CA 2023 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-06-19 | Valid |
| Telekom Security ServerID OV Class 2 CA | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2027-08-02 | Valid |
| Telekom Security OV RSA CA 22 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2032-06-21 | Valid |
| TeleSec Business TLS-CA 2022 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2032-06-21 | Valid |
| Telekom Security DV RSA CA 22 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2032-02-22 | Valid |
| TeleSec Business CA 21 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2031-11-17 | Valid |
| Deutsche Telekom AG secure email CA E03 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2030-07-09 | Valid |
| DFN-Verein Certification Authority 2 | DFN-Verein | 2031-02-22 | Valid |
| TeleSec ServerPass Class 2 CA | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2024-02-11 | Expired |
| TeleSec Business CA 1 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2024-11-29 | Expired |
| T-TeleSec GlobalCA Class 2 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2018-10-01 | Expired |
| Telekom Security OV qCA 25 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Revoked |
| Telekom Security SMIME qCA 25 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2033-09-30 | Revoked |
| Deutsche Telekom AG secure email CA E04 | Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH | 2028-06-19 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
2 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2, can still build a chain.
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://pki.telesec.de/rl/GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 14 valid intermediates signed by T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://grcl2.crl.telesec.de/rl/T-TeleSec_GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl(11) - CRL:
http://crl-cpki.telekom.de/rl/GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl(1) - CRL:
http://crl-cpki.telekom.de/rl/T-TeleSec_GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl(1) - CRL:
http://pki0336.telesec.de/rl/TeleSec_GlobalRoot_Class_2.crl(1) - CRL:
ldap://ldap-cpki.telekom.de/CN=T-TeleSec%20GlobalRoot%20Class%202,OU=T-TeleSec%20Trust%20Center,O=T-Systems%20Enterprise%20Services%20GmbH,C=DE?authorityRevocationList(1) - OCSP:
http://grcl2.ocsp.telesec.de/ocspr(11) - OCSP:
http://ocsp.telekom.de/ocspr(2) - OCSP:
http://ocsp0336.telesec.de/ocspr(1)
What happens when it expires
T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 is valid until 2033-10-01, about 6.9 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-05-28.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 by common name (T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 91E2F5788D5810EBA7BA58737DE1548A8ECACD014598BC0B143E041B17052552
Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root 590D2D7D884F402E617EA562321765CF17D894E9
Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2"
Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "91:E2:F5:78:8D:58:10:EB:A7:BA:58:73:7D:E1:54:8A:8E:CA:CD:01:45:98:BC:0B:14:3E:04:1B:17:05:25:52"
Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH → T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in telekom-security-t-telesec-globalroot-class-2.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=91:E2:F5:78:8D:58:10:EB:A7:BA:58:73:7D:E1:54:8A:8E:CA:CD:01:45:98:BC:0B:14:3E:04:1B:17:05:25:52
FAQ
Is T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-05-28.
When does T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 expire?
On 2033-10-01, about 6.9 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 issued?
The CCADB lists 32: 14 valid, 3 expired and 15 revoked. The newest valid one is Telekom Security SMIME ECC Root 2021, valid until 2033-09-30.
Is T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 cross-signed?
Yes. The CCADB has 2 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2; 0 of them are still valid.
Other roots from Deutsche Telekom Security
- T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3 RSA 2048 · 2033-10-01
- Telekom Security TLS ECC Root 2020 ECDSA P-384 · 2045-08-25
- Telekom Security TLS RSA Root 2023 RSA 4096 · 2048-03-27
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV