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Root certificate · DigiCert

DigiCert Assured ID Root G2

DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 is a root CA certificate operated by DigiCert (RSA 2048, valid until 2038-01-15, SHA-256 7D05EBB6). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes2026-09-14Yes
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleIncluded IncludedYes—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—No

Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-09-14 (sct_not_after). Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.16.840.1.114412.2.1.

Included Chrome

Status
Included
Distrust for TLS after
2026-09-14

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites, Email
EV policy OIDs
2.16.840.1.114412.2.1
First included in
NSS 3.16.3 / Firefox 32
Inclusion bug
#908827

Included Apple

Status
Included
Trust bits
serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
DigiCert
Subject
CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G2,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
SHA-256
7D05EBB682339F8C9451EE094EEBFEFA7953A114EDB2F44949452FAB7D2FC185
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
A14B48D943EE0A0E40904F3CE0A4C09193515D3F
SPKI SHA-256
F1C6BA670CFC88E4DF52973CAE420F0A089DD474144FE5806C420064E1591229
Valid from
2013-08-01
Expires
2038-01-15
Key
RSA 2048
Signature algorithm
sha256WithRSAEncryption
Serial number
B931C3AD63967EA6723BFC3AF9AF44B
Country
US
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
2.16.840.1.114412.2.1, 2.23.140.1.1, 2.23.140.1.3 · TLS EV capable: Yes
Test websites
valid: https://assured-id-root-g2.chain-demos.digicert.com · expired: https://assured-id-root-g2-expired.chain-demos.digicert.com/ · revoked: https://assured-id-root-g2-revoked.chain-demos.digicert.com/
CCADB record
A000115
PEM
digicert-assured-id-root-g2.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 163 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by DigiCert Assured ID Root G2: 139 currently valid, 9 expired and 15 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 20 of 163: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
DigiCert Assured ID G2 TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2026 CA2 DigiCert2036-08-20Valid
DigiCert KMS Solutions GCC-H Email CA - G2 DigiCert2036-01-27Valid
Noblis Co-branded Issuing CA DigiCert2035-10-14Valid
Department for Work & Pensions Client CA DigiCert2035-09-16Valid
SGN FISGLOBAL PUBLIC CA 3 DigiCert2035-09-03Valid
Telenor Norge AS T G2 CA DigiCert2035-08-26Valid
Telenor Norge AS P G2 CA DigiCert2035-08-26Valid
NGA CA G5 DigiCert2035-04-15Valid
Absa Group Limited Public CA2 DigiCert2035-04-01Valid
Freistaat Bayern ICA DigiCert2035-03-11Valid
WIPO CA - G6 DigiCert2035-03-11Valid
ULA CA - G7 DigiCert2035-02-25Valid
Shell Corporate Email CA G2 DigiCert2035-02-11Valid
Avaya Client Services Users CA 3 DigiCert2035-02-04Valid
Saudi Telecom Company Email CA - G2 DigiCert2035-01-28Valid
Adacom S.A. Class 1 - Public Trust CA G4 DigiCert2035-01-14Valid
Adacom S.A. Class 2 - Public Trust CA G4 DigiCert2035-01-14Valid
Giesecke and Devrient CA G2 DigiCert2034-12-11Valid
SRI International CA - G5 DigiCert2034-11-19Valid
Johns Hopkins Aramco Healthcare Issuing CA - G3 DigiCert2034-11-19Valid

Cross-signed versions

1 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not DigiCert Assured ID Root G2, can still build a chain.

Signed byCA ownerExpiresStatus
DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA crt.sh DigiCert2031-11-09Valid

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootG2.crl
  • http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootG2.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 139 valid intermediates signed by DigiCert Assured ID Root G2; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootG2.crl (139)
  • CRL: http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootG2.crl (47)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp.digicert.com (139)

What happens when it expires

DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 is valid until 2038-01-15, about 11.2 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-09-14.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 by common name (DigiCert Assured ID Root G2) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "DigiCert Assured ID Root G2" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 7D05EBB682339F8C9451EE094EEBFEFA7953A114EDB2F44949452FAB7D2FC185

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root A14B48D943EE0A0E40904F3CE0A4C09193515D3F

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "DigiCert Assured ID Root G2"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "DigiCert Assured ID Root G2"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "7D:05:EB:B6:82:33:9F:8C:94:51:EE:09:4E:EB:FE:FA:79:53:A1:14:ED:B2:F4:49:49:45:2F:AB:7D:2F:C1:85"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for DigiCert Inc → DigiCert Assured ID Root G2.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in digicert-assured-id-root-g2.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=7D:05:EB:B6:82:33:9F:8C:94:51:EE:09:4E:EB:FE:FA:79:53:A1:14:ED:B2:F4:49:49:45:2F:AB:7D:2F:C1:85

FAQ

Is DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-09-14.

When does DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 expire?

On 2038-01-15, about 11.2 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 issued?

The CCADB lists 163: 139 valid, 9 expired and 15 revoked. The newest valid one is DigiCert Assured ID G2 TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2026 CA2, valid until 2036-08-20.

Is DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 cross-signed?

Yes. The CCADB has 1 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA; 1 of them are still valid.

Other roots from DigiCert

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV