Root certificate · SHECA
UCA Extended Validation Root
UCA Extended Validation Root is a root CA certificate operated by SHECA (RSA 4096, valid until 2038-12-31, SHA-256 D43AF9B3). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Not included Not included | No | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.23.140.1.1.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites
- EV policy OIDs
- 2.23.140.1.1
- First included in
- NSS 3.41 / Firefox 65
- Inclusion bug
- #1309797
Not included Apple
- Status
- Not included
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd.
- Subject
- CN=UCA Extended Validation Root,O=UniTrust,C=CN
- SHA-256
D43AF9B35473755C9684FC06D7D8CB70EE5C28E773FB294EB41EE71722924D24- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
A3A1B06F2461234AE336A5C237FCA6FFDDF0D73A- SPKI SHA-256
5C41A73AB2C35DFCD771F6FD6E3E8FAC9B469D386CADDA56A95B646EB48CCA34- Valid from
- 2015-03-13
- Expires
- 2038-12-31
- Key
- RSA 4096
- Signature algorithm
- sha256WithRSAEncryption
- Serial number
4FD22B8FF564C8339E4F345866237060- Country
- CN
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- 2.23.140.1.1, 2.23.140.1.3, 1.2.156.112570.1.1.3 · TLS EV capable: Yes
- Test websites
- valid:
https://rsaevg3.good.sheca.com/· expired:https://rsaevg3.expired.sheca.com/· revoked:https://rsaevg3.revoked.sheca.com/ - CCADB record
- A003653
- PEM
- sheca-uca-extended-validation-root.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 11 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by UCA Extended Validation Root: 3 currently valid, 0 expired and 8 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 11 of 11: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| SHECA EV TLS ECC CA C2 | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2035-04-27 | Valid |
| SHECA EV TLS RSA CA C1 | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2035-04-27 | Valid |
| SHECA EV Server CA G3 | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2036-03-16 | Valid |
| SHECA EV Code Signing CA G3 | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2039-05-27 | Revoked |
| SHECA OV Server CA G7 | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2038-03-28 | Revoked |
| SHECA OV Server CA G6 | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2037-11-08 | Revoked |
| SHECA EV Code Signing CA G2 | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2036-03-16 | Revoked |
| SHECA RSA Extended Validation Code Signing CA | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2033-04-27 | Revoked |
| SHECA RSA Extended Validation Server CA | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2033-04-27 | Revoked |
| SHECA Extended Validation Code Signing CA | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2030-12-31 | Revoked |
| SHECA Extended Validation SSL CA | Shanghai Electronic Certification Authority Co., Ltd. | 2030-12-31 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as UCA Extended Validation Root with a different issuer, so a client has to carry UCA Extended Validation Root itself in its root store to trust it.
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
UCA Extended Validation Root itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://crl.global.sheca.com/root/evg1.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 3 valid intermediates signed by UCA Extended Validation Root; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://crl.global.sheca.com/root/evrcag1.crl(2) - CRL:
http://crl.global.sheca.com/root/evg1.crl(1) - OCSP:
http://ocsp.global.sheca.com/evrcag1(2) - OCSP:
http://ocsp.global.sheca.com/evg1(1)
What happens when it expires
UCA Extended Validation Root is valid until 2038-12-31, about 12.1 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up UCA Extended Validation Root by common name (UCA Extended Validation Root) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Not included)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "UCA Extended Validation Root" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: D43AF9B35473755C9684FC06D7D8CB70EE5C28E773FB294EB41EE71722924D24
Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root A3A1B06F2461234AE336A5C237FCA6FFDDF0D73A
Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "UCA Extended Validation Root"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "UCA Extended Validation Root"
Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "D4:3A:F9:B3:54:73:75:5C:96:84:FC:06:D7:D8:CB:70:EE:5C:28:E7:73:FB:29:4E:B4:1E:E7:17:22:92:4D:24"
Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for UniTrust → UCA Extended Validation Root.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in sheca-uca-extended-validation-root.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=D4:3A:F9:B3:54:73:75:5C:96:84:FC:06:D7:D8:CB:70:EE:5C:28:E7:73:FB:29:4E:B4:1E:E7:17:22:92:4D:24
FAQ
Is UCA Extended Validation Root trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not.
When does UCA Extended Validation Root expire?
On 2038-12-31, about 12.1 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has UCA Extended Validation Root issued?
The CCADB lists 11: 3 valid, 0 expired and 8 revoked. The newest valid one is SHECA EV TLS ECC CA C2, valid until 2035-04-27.
Is UCA Extended Validation Root cross-signed?
No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.
Other roots from SHECA
- UCA Global G2 Root RSA 4096 · 2040-12-31
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV