Root certificate · Sectigo

USERTrust ECC Certification Authority

USERTrust ECC Certification Authority is a root CA certificate operated by Sectigo (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2038-01-18, SHA-256 4FF460D5). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes2026-09-30Yes
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleIncluded IncludedYes—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—No

Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-09-30 (sct_not_after). Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1.

Included Chrome

Status
Included
Distrust for TLS after
2026-09-30

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites, Email
EV policy OIDs
1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1
First included in
NSS 3.17.3 / Firefox 36
Inclusion bug
#606947

Included Apple

Status
Included
Trust bits
serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Encrypting File System, IP Security Tunnel Termination, IP Security User, Secure Email, Time Stamping

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
Sectigo
Subject
CN=USERTrust ECC Certification Authority,O=The USERTRUST Network,L=Jersey City,ST=New Jersey,C=US
SHA-256
4FF460D54B9C86DABFBCFC5712E0400D2BED3FBC4D4FBDAA86E06ADCD2A9AD7A
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
D1CBCA5DB2D52A7F693B674DE5F05A1D0C957DF0
SPKI SHA-256
2021917E98263945C859C43F1D73CB4139053C414FA03CA3BC7EE88614298F3B
Valid from
2010-02-01
Expires
2038-01-18
Key
ECDSA P-384
Signature algorithm
ecdsa-with-SHA384
Serial number
5C8B99C55A94C5D27156DECD8980CC26
Country
US
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Encrypting File System, Time Stamping, IP Security Tunnel Termination, IP Security User
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.1.5.1, 2.23.140.1.1, 2.23.140.1.3 · TLS EV capable: Yes
Test websites
valid: https://usertrustecccertificationauthority-ev.comodoca.com/ · expired: https://usertrustecccertificationauthority-ev.comodoca.com:442/ · revoked: https://usertrustecccertificationauthority-ev.comodoca.com:444/
CCADB record
A000287
PEM
sectigo-usertrust-ecc-ca.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 214 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by USERTrust ECC Certification Authority: 195 currently valid, 8 expired and 11 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 20 of 214: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
iTrust ECC DV SSL CA Sectigo2034-11-05Valid
iTrust ECC OV SSL CA Sectigo2034-11-05Valid
iTrust ECC EV SSL CA Sectigo2034-11-05Valid
iTrust ECC Secure Email CA Sectigo2034-11-05Valid
GZCA ECC EV SSL CA Sectigo2034-09-17Valid
GZCA ECC OV SSL CA Sectigo2034-09-17Valid
TLC ECC EV SSL CA 2 Sectigo2034-06-20Valid
TLC ECC DV SSL CA 2 Sectigo2034-06-20Valid
TLC ECC OV SSL CA 2 Sectigo2034-06-20Valid
Apple Public Client ECC CA 50 - G1 Apple Inc.2030-04-10Valid
ZDNS ECC EV SSL CA Sectigo2033-10-25Valid
ZDNS ECC DV SSL CA Sectigo2033-10-25Valid
ZDNS ECC OV SSL CA Sectigo2033-10-25Valid
CTI ECC Code Signing CA Sectigo2033-08-01Valid
CTI ECC OV SSL CA Sectigo2033-08-01Valid
时代互联 ECC Secure Email CA Sectigo2033-08-01Valid
时代互联 ECC OV SSL CA Sectigo2033-08-01Valid
Site Blindado ECC Organization Validation Secure Server CA 3 Sectigo2033-08-01Valid
Site Blindado ECC Code Signing CA 3 Sectigo2033-08-01Valid
CTI ECC EV SSL CA Sectigo2033-08-01Valid

Cross-signed versions

3 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as USERTrust ECC Certification Authority but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not USERTrust ECC Certification Authority, can still build a chain.

Signed byCA ownerExpiresStatus
AAA Certificate Services crt.sh Sectigo2028-12-31Valid
AddTrust External CA Root crt.sh Sectigo2020-05-30Expired
AddTrust External CA Root crt.sh Sectigo2020-05-30Expired

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

USERTrust ECC Certification Authority itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://crl.usertrust.com/USERTrustECCCertificationAuthority.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 195 valid intermediates signed by USERTrust ECC Certification Authority; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://crl.usertrust.com/USERTrustECCCertificationAuthority.crl (193)
  • CRL: http://crl.trust-provider.com/USERTrustECCCertificationAuthority.crl (2)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp.usertrust.com (193)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp.trust-provider.com (2)

What happens when it expires

USERTrust ECC Certification Authority is valid until 2038-01-18, about 11.2 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-09-30.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up USERTrust ECC Certification Authority by common name (USERTrust ECC Certification Authority) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "USERTrust ECC Certification Authority" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 4FF460D54B9C86DABFBCFC5712E0400D2BED3FBC4D4FBDAA86E06ADCD2A9AD7A

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root D1CBCA5DB2D52A7F693B674DE5F05A1D0C957DF0

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "USERTrust ECC Certification Authority"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "USERTrust ECC Certification Authority"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "4F:F4:60:D5:4B:9C:86:DA:BF:BC:FC:57:12:E0:40:0D:2B:ED:3F:BC:4D:4F:BD:AA:86:E0:6A:DC:D2:A9:AD:7A"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for The USERTRUST Network → USERTrust ECC Certification Authority.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in sectigo-usertrust-ecc-ca.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=4F:F4:60:D5:4B:9C:86:DA:BF:BC:FC:57:12:E0:40:0D:2B:ED:3F:BC:4D:4F:BD:AA:86:E0:6A:DC:D2:A9:AD:7A

FAQ

Is USERTrust ECC Certification Authority trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-09-30.

When does USERTrust ECC Certification Authority expire?

On 2038-01-18, about 11.2 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has USERTrust ECC Certification Authority issued?

The CCADB lists 214: 195 valid, 8 expired and 11 revoked. The newest valid one is iTrust ECC DV SSL CA, valid until 2034-11-05.

Is USERTrust ECC Certification Authority cross-signed?

Yes. The CCADB has 3 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by AAA Certificate Services, AddTrust External CA Root; 1 of them are still valid.

Other roots from Sectigo

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV