Root certificate · SECOM Trust Systems
Security Communication ECC RootCA1
Security Communication ECC RootCA1 is a root CA certificate operated by SECOM Trust Systems (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2038-01-18, SHA-256 E74FBDA5). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Not included Not included | No | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | Yes |
The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for Security Communication ECC RootCA1.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites
- EV policy OIDs
- not EV-enabled
- First included in
- NSS 3.83 / Firefox 106
- Inclusion bug
- #1313982
Not included Apple
- Status
- Not included
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Document Signing, Encrypting File System, Secure Email, Time Stamping
- Not-before cutoff
- 2025-09-15 (Code Signing, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping)
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.
- Subject
- CN=Security Communication ECC RootCA1,O=SECOM Trust Systems CO.\,LTD.,C=JP
- SHA-256
E74FBDA55BD564C473A36B441AA799C8A68E077440E8288B9FA1E50E4BBACA11- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
B80E26A9BFD2B23BC0EF46C9BAC7BBF61D0D4141- SPKI SHA-256
3329BFA13B6007AB5FC3713F0ACB289426E2FBC99CC5C110A914B139571600B6- Valid from
- 2016-06-16
- Expires
- 2038-01-18
- Key
- ECDSA P-384
- Signature algorithm
- ecdsa-with-SHA384
- Serial number
D65D9BB378812EEB- Country
- JP
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Encrypting File System
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
- Test websites
- valid:
https://cross-ovecc2024v.secomtrust-verification.com/· expired:https://cross-ovecc2024e.secomtrust-verification.com/· revoked:https://cross-ovecc2024r.secomtrust-verification.com/ - CCADB record
- A004061
- PEM
- secom-security-communication-ecc-rootca1.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 11 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Security Communication ECC RootCA1: 4 currently valid, 1 expired and 6 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 11 of 11: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024 → SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024 | SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd. | 2038-01-18 | Valid |
| JPRS OV ECC CA 2024 G1 | Japan Registry Services Co., Ltd. | 2031-06-16 | Valid |
| JPRS DV ECC CA 2024 G1 | Japan Registry Services Co., Ltd. | 2031-06-16 | Valid |
| NII Open Domain CA - G7 ECC | SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. | 2030-12-15 | Valid |
| Subordinate Advanced ECC CA1_2016-2019 | SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. | 2019-12-15 | Expired |
| Subordinate Advanced ECC CA G2 | SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd. | 2038-01-18 | Revoked |
| Subordinate Advanced ECC CA G2_2020-2030 | SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd. | 2030-10-07 | Revoked |
| NII Open Domain CA - G6 | SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. | 2030-05-20 | Revoked |
| NII Open Domain CA - G6 | SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. | 2030-03-23 | Revoked |
| NII Open Domain CA - G6 | SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. | 2029-03-14 | Revoked |
| NII Open Domain CA - G6 | SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. | 2028-03-22 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
1 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as Security Communication ECC RootCA1 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not Security Communication ECC RootCA1, can still build a chain.
| Signed by | CA owner | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security Communication RootCA2 crt.sh | SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd. | 2029-05-29 | Valid |
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
Security Communication ECC RootCA1 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-ECC-Root1/SCECCRoot1CRL.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 4 valid intermediates signed by Security Communication ECC RootCA1; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-ECC-Root1/SCECCRoot1CRL.crl(4) - OCSP:
http://sceccrootca1.ocsp.secomtrust.net(4)
What happens when it expires
Security Communication ECC RootCA1 is valid until 2038-01-18, about 11.2 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Security Communication ECC RootCA1 by common name (Security Communication ECC RootCA1) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Not included)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "Security Communication ECC RootCA1" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: E74FBDA55BD564C473A36B441AA799C8A68E077440E8288B9FA1E50E4BBACA11
Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root B80E26A9BFD2B23BC0EF46C9BAC7BBF61D0D4141
Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Security Communication ECC RootCA1"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Security Communication ECC RootCA1"
Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "E7:4F:BD:A5:5B:D5:64:C4:73:A3:6B:44:1A:A7:99:C8:A6:8E:07:74:40:E8:28:8B:9F:A1:E5:0E:4B:BA:CA:11"
Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD. → Security Communication ECC RootCA1.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in secom-security-communication-ecc-rootca1.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=E7:4F:BD:A5:5B:D5:64:C4:73:A3:6B:44:1A:A7:99:C8:A6:8E:07:74:40:E8:28:8B:9F:A1:E5:0E:4B:BA:CA:11
FAQ
Is Security Communication ECC RootCA1 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not.
When does Security Communication ECC RootCA1 expire?
On 2038-01-18, about 11.2 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has Security Communication ECC RootCA1 issued?
The CCADB lists 11: 4 valid, 1 expired and 6 revoked. The newest valid one is SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024, valid until 2038-01-18.
Is Security Communication ECC RootCA1 cross-signed?
Yes. The CCADB has 1 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by Security Communication RootCA2; 1 of them are still valid.
Other roots from SECOM Trust Systems
- SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024 ECDSA P-384 · 2049-01-14
- SECOM TLS RSA Root CA 2024 RSA 4096 · 2049-01-14
- Security Communication RootCA2 RSA 2048 · 2029-05-29
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV