Root certificate · SECOM Trust Systems

Security Communication ECC RootCA1

Security Communication ECC RootCA1 is a root CA certificate operated by SECOM Trust Systems (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2038-01-18, SHA-256 E74FBDA5). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes—No
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleNot included Not includedNo—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—Yes

The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for Security Communication ECC RootCA1.

Included Chrome

Status
Included

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites
EV policy OIDs
not EV-enabled
First included in
NSS 3.83 / Firefox 106
Inclusion bug
#1313982

Not included Apple

Status
Not included

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Document Signing, Encrypting File System, Secure Email, Time Stamping
Not-before cutoff
2025-09-15 (Code Signing, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping)

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.
Subject
CN=Security Communication ECC RootCA1,O=SECOM Trust Systems CO.\,LTD.,C=JP
SHA-256
E74FBDA55BD564C473A36B441AA799C8A68E077440E8288B9FA1E50E4BBACA11
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
B80E26A9BFD2B23BC0EF46C9BAC7BBF61D0D4141
SPKI SHA-256
3329BFA13B6007AB5FC3713F0ACB289426E2FBC99CC5C110A914B139571600B6
Valid from
2016-06-16
Expires
2038-01-18
Key
ECDSA P-384
Signature algorithm
ecdsa-with-SHA384
Serial number
D65D9BB378812EEB
Country
JP
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Encrypting File System
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites
valid: https://cross-ovecc2024v.secomtrust-verification.com/ · expired: https://cross-ovecc2024e.secomtrust-verification.com/ · revoked: https://cross-ovecc2024r.secomtrust-verification.com/
CCADB record
A004061
PEM
secom-security-communication-ecc-rootca1.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 11 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Security Communication ECC RootCA1: 4 currently valid, 1 expired and 6 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 11 of 11: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024 → SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024 SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.2038-01-18Valid
JPRS OV ECC CA 2024 G1 Japan Registry Services Co., Ltd.2031-06-16Valid
JPRS DV ECC CA 2024 G1 Japan Registry Services Co., Ltd.2031-06-16Valid
NII Open Domain CA - G7 ECC SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.2030-12-15Valid
Subordinate Advanced ECC CA1_2016-2019 SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.2019-12-15Expired
Subordinate Advanced ECC CA G2 SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.2038-01-18Revoked
Subordinate Advanced ECC CA G2_2020-2030 SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.2030-10-07Revoked
NII Open Domain CA - G6 SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.2030-05-20Revoked
NII Open Domain CA - G6 SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.2030-03-23Revoked
NII Open Domain CA - G6 SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.2029-03-14Revoked
NII Open Domain CA - G6 SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.2028-03-22Revoked

Cross-signed versions

1 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as Security Communication ECC RootCA1 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not Security Communication ECC RootCA1, can still build a chain.

Signed byCA ownerExpiresStatus
Security Communication RootCA2 crt.sh SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd.2029-05-29Valid

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

Security Communication ECC RootCA1 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-ECC-Root1/SCECCRoot1CRL.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 4 valid intermediates signed by Security Communication ECC RootCA1; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://repository.secomtrust.net/SC-ECC-Root1/SCECCRoot1CRL.crl (4)
  • OCSP: http://sceccrootca1.ocsp.secomtrust.net (4)

What happens when it expires

Security Communication ECC RootCA1 is valid until 2038-01-18, about 11.2 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Security Communication ECC RootCA1 by common name (Security Communication ECC RootCA1) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Not included)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "Security Communication ECC RootCA1" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: E74FBDA55BD564C473A36B441AA799C8A68E077440E8288B9FA1E50E4BBACA11

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root B80E26A9BFD2B23BC0EF46C9BAC7BBF61D0D4141

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Security Communication ECC RootCA1"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Security Communication ECC RootCA1"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "E7:4F:BD:A5:5B:D5:64:C4:73:A3:6B:44:1A:A7:99:C8:A6:8E:07:74:40:E8:28:8B:9F:A1:E5:0E:4B:BA:CA:11"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD. → Security Communication ECC RootCA1.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in secom-security-communication-ecc-rootca1.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=E7:4F:BD:A5:5B:D5:64:C4:73:A3:6B:44:1A:A7:99:C8:A6:8E:07:74:40:E8:28:8B:9F:A1:E5:0E:4B:BA:CA:11

FAQ

Is Security Communication ECC RootCA1 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not.

When does Security Communication ECC RootCA1 expire?

On 2038-01-18, about 11.2 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has Security Communication ECC RootCA1 issued?

The CCADB lists 11: 4 valid, 1 expired and 6 revoked. The newest valid one is SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024, valid until 2038-01-18.

Is Security Communication ECC RootCA1 cross-signed?

Yes. The CCADB has 1 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by Security Communication RootCA2; 1 of them are still valid.

Other roots from SECOM Trust Systems

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV