Root certificate · OISTE

OISTE Server Root ECC G1

OISTE Server Root ECC G1 is a root CA certificate operated by OISTE (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2048-05-24, SHA-256 EEC997C0). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 2 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes—No
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleNot included Not includedNo—No
MicrosoftNot included Not includedNo—No

Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.23.140.1.1.

Included Chrome

Status
Included

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites
EV policy OIDs
2.23.140.1.1
First included in
3.117 / 145

Not included Apple

Status
Not included

Not included Microsoft

Status
Not included

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
OISTE
Subject
CN=OISTE Server Root ECC G1,O=OISTE Foundation,C=CH
SHA-256
EEC997C0C30F216F7E3B8B307D2BAE42412D753FC8219DAFD1520B2572850F49
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
3BF68B09AE2A927BBAE38D3F1195D9E6440C45E2
SPKI SHA-256
D439DD80F1E3BC5C9E5F13E8BFF7A8887DF9DC1C3E19D76AF70C8F8D985EEF22
Valid from
2023-05-31
Expires
2048-05-24
Key
ECDSA P-384
Signature algorithm
ecdsa-with-SHA384
Serial number
23F9C3D635AF8F284B1FF054EA7E979D
Country
CH
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
2.23.140.1.1 · TLS EV capable: Yes
Test websites
valid: https://eccg1evvalidssl.hightrusted.com/ · expired: https://eccg1evexpiredssl.hightrusted.com/ · revoked: https://eccg1evrevokedssl.hightrusted.com/
CCADB record
A011075
PEM
oiste-server-root-ecc-g1.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 3 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by OISTE Server Root ECC G1: 3 currently valid, 0 expired and 0 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 3 of 3: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
TuringSign ECC Secure CA 3 OISTE2029-02-24Valid
WISeKey CertifyID Server ECC CA 2 OISTE2029-02-24Valid
WISeKey CertifyID Server ECC CA 1 WISeKey2039-02-16Valid

Cross-signed versions

1 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as OISTE Server Root ECC G1 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not OISTE Server Root ECC G1, can still build a chain.

Signed byCA ownerExpiresStatus
OISTE WISeKey Global Root GB CA crt.sh OISTE2039-12-01Valid

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

OISTE Server Root ECC G1 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://public.wisekey.com/crl/osreccg1.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 3 valid intermediates signed by OISTE Server Root ECC G1; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://public.wisekey.com/crl/osreccg1.crl (3)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp.wisekey.com (1)

What happens when it expires

OISTE Server Root ECC G1 is valid until 2048-05-24, about 21.5 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up OISTE Server Root ECC G1 by common name (OISTE Server Root ECC G1) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Not included)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "OISTE Server Root ECC G1" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: EEC997C0C30F216F7E3B8B307D2BAE42412D753FC8219DAFD1520B2572850F49

Windows (Microsoft store: Not included)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root 3BF68B09AE2A927BBAE38D3F1195D9E6440C45E2

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "OISTE Server Root ECC G1"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "OISTE Server Root ECC G1"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "EE:C9:97:C0:C3:0F:21:6F:7E:3B:8B:30:7D:2B:AE:42:41:2D:75:3F:C8:21:9D:AF:D1:52:0B:25:72:85:0F:49"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for OISTE Foundation → OISTE Server Root ECC G1.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in oiste-server-root-ecc-g1.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=EE:C9:97:C0:C3:0F:21:6F:7E:3B:8B:30:7D:2B:AE:42:41:2D:75:3F:C8:21:9D:AF:D1:52:0B:25:72:85:0F:49

FAQ

Is OISTE Server Root ECC G1 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple, Microsoft do not.

When does OISTE Server Root ECC G1 expire?

On 2048-05-24, about 21.5 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has OISTE Server Root ECC G1 issued?

The CCADB lists 3: 3 valid, 0 expired and 0 revoked. The newest valid one is TuringSign ECC Secure CA 3, valid until 2029-02-24.

Is OISTE Server Root ECC G1 cross-signed?

Yes. The CCADB has 1 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by OISTE WISeKey Global Root GB CA; 1 of them are still valid.

Other roots from OISTE

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV