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Root certificate · Microsoft

Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017

Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 is a root CA certificate operated by Microsoft (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2042-07-18, SHA-256 358DF39D). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes—No
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleIncluded IncludedYes—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—No

The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017.

Included Chrome

Status
Included

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites
EV policy OIDs
not EV-enabled
First included in
NSS 3.54 / Firefox 79
Inclusion bug
#1448093

Included Apple

Status
Included
Trust bits
serverAuth, clientAuth

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
Microsoft Corporation
Subject
CN=Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017,O=Microsoft Corporation,C=US
SHA-256
358DF39D764AF9E1B766E9C972DF352EE15CFAC227AF6AD1D70E8E4A6EDCBA02
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
999A64C37FF47D9FAB95F14769891460EEC4C3C5
SPKI SHA-256
35F53CE1264611E03340FE37E1EC7D4CC986C5613DCA70FD04AA44545F2DAF28
Valid from
2019-12-18
Expires
2042-07-18
Key
ECDSA P-384
Signature algorithm
ecdsa-with-SHA384
Serial number
66F23DAF87DE8BB14AEA0C573101C2EC
Country
US
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites
valid: https://acteccroot2017.pki.microsoft.com/ · expired: https://expeccroot2017.pki.microsoft.com/ · revoked: https://rvkeccroot2017.pki.microsoft.com/
CCADB record
A006902
PEM
microsoft-ecc-root-ca-2017.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 18 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017: 6 currently valid, 8 expired and 4 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 18 of 18: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
Microsoft TLS G1 ECC CA 02 Microsoft Corporation2030-08-28Valid
Microsoft TLS G1 ECC CA 01 Microsoft Corporation2030-08-28Valid
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 07 Microsoft Corporation2028-05-25Valid
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 04 Microsoft Corporation2028-05-25Valid
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 03 Microsoft Corporation2028-05-25Valid
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 08 Microsoft Corporation2028-05-25Valid
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing AOC CA 02 Microsoft Corporation2026-06-24Expired
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing EOC CA 02 Microsoft Corporation2026-06-24Expired
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing AOC CA 01 Microsoft Corporation2026-06-24Expired
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing EOC CA 01 Microsoft Corporation2026-06-24Expired
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 05 Microsoft Corporation2024-06-27Expired
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 02 Microsoft Corporation2024-06-27Expired
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 01 Microsoft Corporation2024-06-27Expired
Microsoft Azure ECC TLS Issuing CA 06 Microsoft Corporation2024-06-27Expired
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing AOC CA 01 Microsoft Corporation2026-03-11Revoked
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing EOC CA 01 Microsoft Corporation2026-03-11Revoked
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing EOC CA 02 Microsoft Corporation2026-03-11Revoked
Microsoft ECC TLS Issuing AOC CA 02 Microsoft Corporation2026-03-11Revoked

Cross-signed versions

No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 with a different issuer, so a client has to carry Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 itself in its root store to trust it.

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20ECC%20Root%20Certificate%20Authority%202017.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 6 valid intermediates signed by Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20ECC%20Root%20Certificate%20Authority%202017.crl (6)
  • CRL: http://crl2.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20ECC%20Root%20Certificate%20Authority%202017.crl (2)
  • OCSP: http://oneocsp.microsoft.com/ocsp (6)

What happens when it expires

Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 is valid until 2042-07-18, about 15.7 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 by common name (Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 358DF39D764AF9E1B766E9C972DF352EE15CFAC227AF6AD1D70E8E4A6EDCBA02

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root 999A64C37FF47D9FAB95F14769891460EEC4C3C5

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "35:8D:F3:9D:76:4A:F9:E1:B7:66:E9:C9:72:DF:35:2E:E1:5C:FA:C2:27:AF:6A:D1:D7:0E:8E:4A:6E:DC:BA:02"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Microsoft Corporation → Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in microsoft-ecc-root-ca-2017.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=35:8D:F3:9D:76:4A:F9:E1:B7:66:E9:C9:72:DF:35:2E:E1:5C:FA:C2:27:AF:6A:D1:D7:0E:8E:4A:6E:DC:BA:02

FAQ

Is Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication.

When does Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 expire?

On 2042-07-18, about 15.7 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 issued?

The CCADB lists 18: 6 valid, 8 expired and 4 revoked. The newest valid one is Microsoft TLS G1 ECC CA 02, valid until 2030-08-28.

Is Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 cross-signed?

No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.

Other roots from Microsoft

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV