Root certificate · KIR

SZAFIR ROOT CA2

SZAFIR ROOT CA2 is a root CA certificate operated by KIR (RSA 2048, valid until 2035-10-19, SHA-256 A1339D33). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes—No
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleNot included Not includedNo—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—No

The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for SZAFIR ROOT CA2.

Included Chrome

Status
Included

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites, Email
EV policy OIDs
not EV-enabled
First included in
NSS 3.23 / Firefox 46
Inclusion bug
#817994

Not included Apple

Status
Not included

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)
Subject
CN=SZAFIR ROOT CA2,O=Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A.,C=PL
SHA-256
A1339D33281A0B56E557D3D32B1CE7F9367EB094BD5FA72A7E5004C8DED7CAFE
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
E252FA953FEDDB2460BD6E28F39CCCCF5EB33FDE
SPKI SHA-256
6E364B6133DEEFDCBB21273C5F445A20AFBC05038D5B021C0C2153039016345B
Valid from
2015-10-19
Expires
2035-10-19
Key
RSA 2048
Signature algorithm
sha256WithRSAEncryption
Serial number
3E8A5D07EC55D232D5B7E3B65F01EB2DDCE4D6E4
Country
PL
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites
valid: https://ssl.elektronicznypodpis.pl/ · expired: https://expired.elektronicznypodpis.pl/ · revoked: https://revoked.elektronicznypodpis.pl/
CCADB record
A000814
PEM
kir-szafir-root-ca2.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 7 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by SZAFIR ROOT CA2: 3 currently valid, 1 expired and 3 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 7 of 7: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
SZAFIR ROOT CA3 TLS Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)2031-07-20Valid
SZAFIR Trusted CA6 Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)2034-10-21Valid
SZAFIR Trusted CA5 Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)2034-10-08Valid
SZAFIR Trusted CA2 Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)2025-10-26Expired
SZAFIR Trusted CA4 Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)2034-09-16Revoked
SZAFIR Trusted CA4 Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)2034-09-16Revoked
SZAFIR Trusted CA3 Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. (KIR)2033-10-11Revoked

Cross-signed versions

No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as SZAFIR ROOT CA2 with a different issuer, so a client has to carry SZAFIR ROOT CA2 itself in its root store to trust it.

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

SZAFIR ROOT CA2 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://cdp.elektronicznypodpis.pl/root_ca2.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 3 valid intermediates signed by SZAFIR ROOT CA2; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://cdp.elektronicznypodpis.pl/root_ca2.crl (3)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp.elektronicznypodpis.pl (3)

What happens when it expires

SZAFIR ROOT CA2 is valid until 2035-10-19, about 8.9 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up SZAFIR ROOT CA2 by common name (SZAFIR ROOT CA2) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Not included)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "SZAFIR ROOT CA2" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: A1339D33281A0B56E557D3D32B1CE7F9367EB094BD5FA72A7E5004C8DED7CAFE

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root E252FA953FEDDB2460BD6E28F39CCCCF5EB33FDE

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "SZAFIR ROOT CA2"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "SZAFIR ROOT CA2"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "A1:33:9D:33:28:1A:0B:56:E5:57:D3:D3:2B:1C:E7:F9:36:7E:B0:94:BD:5F:A7:2A:7E:50:04:C8:DE:D7:CA:FE"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A. → SZAFIR ROOT CA2.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in kir-szafir-root-ca2.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=A1:33:9D:33:28:1A:0B:56:E5:57:D3:D3:2B:1C:E7:F9:36:7E:B0:94:BD:5F:A7:2A:7E:50:04:C8:DE:D7:CA:FE

FAQ

Is SZAFIR ROOT CA2 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Apple do not.

When does SZAFIR ROOT CA2 expire?

On 2035-10-19, about 8.9 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has SZAFIR ROOT CA2 issued?

The CCADB lists 7: 3 valid, 1 expired and 3 revoked. The newest valid one is SZAFIR ROOT CA3 TLS, valid until 2031-07-20.

Is SZAFIR ROOT CA2 cross-signed?

No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV