Root certificate · Hongkong Post / Certizen
Hongkong Post Root CA 3
Hongkong Post Root CA 3 is a root CA certificate operated by Hongkong Post / Certizen (RSA 4096, valid until 2042-06-03, SHA-256 5A2FC03F). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | Yes |
Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.23.140.1.1.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites
- EV policy OIDs
- 2.23.140.1.1
- First included in
- NSS 3.43 / Firefox 67
- Inclusion bug
- #1464306
Included Apple
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- serverAuth, clientAuth
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, OCSP Signing
- Not-before cutoff
- 2019-10-01 (OCSP Signing)
- Disallowed EKUs
- OCSP Signing
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen
- Subject
- CN=Hongkong Post Root CA 3,O=Hongkong Post,L=Hong Kong,ST=Hong Kong,C=HK
- SHA-256
5A2FC03F0C83B090BBFA40604B0988446C7636183DF9846E17101A447FB8EFD6- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
58A2D0EC2052815BC1F3F86402244EC28E024B02- SPKI SHA-256
2541E53BA5B3B07ACBE7097AC4A03E040C11CF7A6D4A67CB213D558B50167A06- Valid from
- 2017-06-03
- Expires
- 2042-06-03
- Key
- RSA 4096
- Signature algorithm
- sha256WithRSAEncryption
- Serial number
8165F8A4CA5EC00C99340DFC4C6AE23B81C5AA4- Country
- HK
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- 2.23.140.1.1 · TLS EV capable: Yes
- Test websites
- valid:
https://valid-ev.ecert.gov.hk/· expired:https://expired-ev.ecert.gov.hk/· revoked:https://revoked-ev.ecert.gov.hk/ - CCADB record
- A005832
- PEM
- hongkong-post-root-ca-3.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 4 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Hongkong Post Root CA 3: 2 currently valid, 0 expired and 2 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 4 of 4: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hongkong Post e-Cert SSL CA 3 - 17 | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2032-06-03 | Valid |
| Hongkong Post e-Cert EV SSL CA 3 - 17 | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2032-06-03 | Valid |
| Hongkong Post e-Cert EV SSL CA 3 - 17 | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2032-06-03 | Revoked |
| Hongkong Post e-Cert SSL CA 3 - 17 | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2032-06-03 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
5 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as Hongkong Post Root CA 3 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not Hongkong Post Root CA 3, can still build a chain.
| Signed by | CA owner | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| GlobalSign crt.sh | GlobalSign nv-sa | 2029-03-18 | Valid |
| Hongkong Post Root CA 1 crt.sh | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2029-05-15 | Valid |
| Hongkong Post Root CA 1 crt.sh | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2023-05-15 | Revoked |
| Hongkong Post Root CA 1 crt.sh | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2023-05-15 | Expired |
| Hongkong Post Root CA 1 crt.sh | Government of Hong Kong (SAR), Hongkong Post, Certizen | 2023-05-15 | Revoked |
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
Hongkong Post Root CA 3 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://crl1.ecert.gov.hk/crl/RootCA3ARL.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 2 valid intermediates signed by Hongkong Post Root CA 3; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://crl1.eCert.gov.hk/crl/RootCA3ARL.crl(2) - OCSP:
http://ocsp1.eCert.gov.hk(2)
What happens when it expires
Hongkong Post Root CA 3 is valid until 2042-06-03, about 15.6 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Hongkong Post Root CA 3 by common name (Hongkong Post Root CA 3) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "Hongkong Post Root CA 3" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 5A2FC03F0C83B090BBFA40604B0988446C7636183DF9846E17101A447FB8EFD6Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root 58A2D0EC2052815BC1F3F86402244EC28E024B02Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Hongkong Post Root CA 3"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Hongkong Post Root CA 3"Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "5A:2F:C0:3F:0C:83:B0:90:BB:FA:40:60:4B:09:88:44:6C:76:36:18:3D:F9:84:6E:17:10:1A:44:7F:B8:EF:D6"Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Hongkong Post → Hongkong Post Root CA 3.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in hongkong-post-root-ca-3.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=5A:2F:C0:3F:0C:83:B0:90:BB:FA:40:60:4B:09:88:44:6C:76:36:18:3D:F9:84:6E:17:10:1A:44:7F:B8:EF:D6FAQ
Is Hongkong Post Root CA 3 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication.
When does Hongkong Post Root CA 3 expire?
On 2042-06-03, about 15.6 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has Hongkong Post Root CA 3 issued?
The CCADB lists 4: 2 valid, 0 expired and 2 revoked. The newest valid one is Hongkong Post e-Cert SSL CA 3 - 17, valid until 2032-06-03.
Is Hongkong Post Root CA 3 cross-signed?
Yes. The CCADB has 5 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by GlobalSign, Hongkong Post Root CA 1; 2 of them are still valid.
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV