Root certificate · GlobalSign

GlobalSign

GlobalSign is a root CA certificate operated by GlobalSign (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2038-01-19, SHA-256 179FBC14). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.

Data updated

Root store status

Root storeStatusTrusted for TLSDistrust for TLS afterConstrained
ChromeIncluded IncludedYes2026-09-30Yes
MozillaIncluded IncludedYes—No
AppleIncluded IncludedYes—No
MicrosoftIncluded IncludedYes—Yes

Chrome stops trusting TLS certificates under this root whose SCTs are dated after 2026-09-30 (sct_not_after). Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.23.140.1.1.

Included Chrome

Status
Included
Distrust for TLS after
2026-09-30

Included Mozilla

Status
Included
Trust bits
Websites, Email
EV policy OIDs
2.23.140.1.1
First included in
NSS 3.17.3 / Firefox 36
Inclusion bug
#825954

Included Apple

Status
Included
Trust bits
serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection

Included Microsoft

Status
Included
Trusted EKUs
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
Not-before cutoff
2021-08-01 (Code Signing)

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner
GlobalSign nv-sa
Subject
CN=GlobalSign,O=GlobalSign,OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5
SHA-256
179FBC148A3DD00FD24EA13458CC43BFA7F59C8182D783A513F6EBEC100C8924
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
1F24C630CDA418EF2069FFAD4FDD5F463A1B69AA
SPKI SHA-256
7E0EAD76BB6819DC2F54511A84354F6E8B307B9DD82058EA6C004F01D9DDA5DF
Valid from
2012-11-13
Expires
2038-01-19
Key
ECDSA P-384
Signature algorithm
ecdsa-with-SHA384
Serial number
605949E0262EBB55F90A778A71F94AD86C
Trust bits (CCADB)
Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email, Time Stamping
EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
2.23.140.1.1, 1.3.6.1.4.1.4146.10.1.1, 1.3.6.1.4.1.4146.1.1, 2.23.140.1.3 · TLS EV capable: Yes
Test websites
valid: https://valid.r5.roots.globalsign.com · expired: https://expired.r5.roots.globalsign.com · revoked: https://revoked.r5.roots.globalsign.com
CCADB record
A000289
PEM
globalsign-179fbc14.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 93 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by GlobalSign: 23 currently valid, 58 expired and 12 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 20 of 93: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

IntermediateOperated byExpiresStatus
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2026 LT GlobalSign nv-sa2029-07-21Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV TLS CA 2026 LT GlobalSign nv-sa2029-07-21Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV TLS CA 2026 Q3 GlobalSign nv-sa2028-04-22Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2026 Q3 GlobalSign nv-sa2028-04-22Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV TLS CA 2026 Q2 GlobalSign nv-sa2028-01-21Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2026 Q2 GlobalSign nv-sa2028-01-21Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2026 Q1 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-10-15Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV TLS CA 2026 Q1 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-10-15Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2025 Q4 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-07-16Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV TLS CA 2025 Q4 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-07-16Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2025 Q3 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-04-16Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV TLS CA 2025 Q3 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-04-16Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV ACME CA 2025 Q2 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-01-22Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV ACME CA 2025 Q2 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-01-22Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2025 Q2 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-01-22Valid
GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 OV TLS CA 2025 Q2 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-01-22Valid
sslTrus GCC E5 OV TLS CA 2024 GlobalSign nv-sa2027-09-18Valid
GlobalSign Timestamping Root E46 GlobalSign nv-sa2031-11-17Valid
GlobalSign Client Authentication Root E45 GlobalSign nv-sa2037-07-28Valid
GlobalSign Code Signing Root E45 GlobalSign nv-sa2037-07-28Valid

Cross-signed versions

2 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as GlobalSign but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not GlobalSign, can still build a chain.

Signed byCA ownerExpiresStatus
GlobalSign Root CA crt.sh GlobalSign nv-sa2028-01-28Valid
GlobalSign crt.sh GlobalSign nv-sa2029-03-18Valid

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

GlobalSign itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

  • http://crl.globalsign.com/root-r5.crl
  • http://crl.globalsign.com/gs/root-r5.crl

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 23 valid intermediates signed by GlobalSign; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

  • CRL: http://crl.globalsign.com/root-r5.crl (23)
  • OCSP: http://ocsp2.globalsign.com/rootr5 (23)

What happens when it expires

GlobalSign is valid until 2038-01-19, about 11.2 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors. Root programs can stop trusting it before it expires: Chrome 2026-09-30.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up GlobalSign by common name (GlobalSign) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "GlobalSign" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 179FBC148A3DD00FD24EA13458CC43BFA7F59C8182D783A513F6EBEC100C8924

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root 1F24C630CDA418EF2069FFAD4FDD5F463A1B69AA

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "GlobalSign"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "GlobalSign"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "17:9F:BC:14:8A:3D:D0:0F:D2:4E:A1:34:58:CC:43:BF:A7:F5:9C:81:82:D7:83:A5:13:F6:EB:EC:10:0C:89:24"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for GlobalSign → GlobalSign.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in globalsign-179fbc14.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=17:9F:BC:14:8A:3D:D0:0F:D2:4E:A1:34:58:CC:43:BF:A7:F5:9C:81:82:D7:83:A5:13:F6:EB:EC:10:0C:89:24

FAQ

Is GlobalSign trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication. Distrust-after dates already set: Chrome 2026-09-30.

When does GlobalSign expire?

On 2038-01-19, about 11.2 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has GlobalSign issued?

The CCADB lists 93: 23 valid, 58 expired and 12 revoked. The newest valid one is GlobalSign Atlas ECCR5 DV TLS CA 2026 LT, valid until 2029-07-21.

Is GlobalSign cross-signed?

Yes. The CCADB has 2 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by GlobalSign Root CA, GlobalSign; 2 of them are still valid.

Other roots from GlobalSign

Sources

  1. CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
  2. CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
  3. CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
  4. CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV