Root certificate · FNMT (Spain)
AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM
AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM is a root CA certificate operated by FNMT (Spain) (RSA 4096, valid until 2030-01-01, SHA-256 EBC5570C). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites
- EV policy OIDs
- not EV-enabled
- First included in
- NSS 3.28.1 / Firefox 51
- Inclusion bug
- #435736
Included Apple
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT)
- Subject
- OU=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM,O=FNMT-RCM,C=ES
- SHA-256
EBC5570C29018C4D67B1AA127BAF12F703B4611EBC17B7DAB5573894179B93FA- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
EC503507B215C4956219E2A89A5B42992C4C2C20- SPKI SHA-256
2FC5667A4B9A2678ED6AC6AD25465FCBF6094BFCD9504097C7A8FA47ADE5E888- Valid from
- 2008-10-29
- Expires
- 2030-01-01
- Key
- RSA 4096
- Signature algorithm
- sha256WithRSAEncryption
- Serial number
5D938D306736C8061D1AC754846907- Country
- ES
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Document Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
- Test websites
- valid:
https://www.sede.fnmt.gob.es· expired:https://testexpired.cert.fnmt.es· revoked:https://testrevoked.cert.fnmt.es - CCADB record
- A004112
- PEM
- fnmt-ac-raiz-fnmt-rcm.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 15 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM: 6 currently valid, 2 expired and 7 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 15 of 15: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS G2R → AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS G2R | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2029-12-16 | Valid |
| AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2029-11-28 | Valid |
| AC Sector Público | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2029-11-28 | Valid |
| AC Representación | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2029-12-31 | Valid |
| AC FNMT Usuarios | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2029-10-28 | Valid |
| AC Componentes Informáticos | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2028-06-24 | Valid |
| AC Administración Pública | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2022-05-21 | Expired |
| AC Administración Pública | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2022-05-21 | Expired |
| AC Componentes Informáticos | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2028-06-27 | Revoked |
| EU ISA CA | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2026-05-31 | Revoked |
| EU ISA CA | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2026-05-31 | Revoked |
| ISA CA | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2025-11-02 | Revoked |
| AC APE | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2023-11-03 | Revoked |
| AC APE | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2023-11-03 | Revoked |
| AC APE | Government of Spain, Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) | 2023-11-03 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM with a different issuer, so a client has to carry AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM itself in its root store to trust it.
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://www.cert.fnmt.es/crls/ARLFNMTRCM.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 6 valid intermediates signed by AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://www.cert.fnmt.es/crls/ARLFNMTRCM.crl(6) - CRL:
ldap://ldapfnmt.cert.fnmt.es/CN=CRL,OU=AC%20RAIZ%20FNMT-RCM,O=FNMT-RCM,C=ES?authorityRevocationList;binary?base?objectclass=cRLDistributionPoint(5) - OCSP:
http://ocspfnmtrcmca.cert.fnmt.es/ocspfnmtrcmca/OcspResponder(6)
What happens when it expires
AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM is valid until 2030-01-01, about 3.1 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM by common name (AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: EBC5570C29018C4D67B1AA127BAF12F703B4611EBC17B7DAB5573894179B93FAWindows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root EC503507B215C4956219E2A89A5B42992C4C2C20Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM"Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "EB:C5:57:0C:29:01:8C:4D:67:B1:AA:12:7B:AF:12:F7:03:B4:61:1E:BC:17:B7:DA:B5:57:38:94:17:9B:93:FA"Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for FNMT-RCM → AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in fnmt-ac-raiz-fnmt-rcm.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=EB:C5:57:0C:29:01:8C:4D:67:B1:AA:12:7B:AF:12:F7:03:B4:61:1E:BC:17:B7:DA:B5:57:38:94:17:9B:93:FAFAQ
Is AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication.
When does AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM expire?
On 2030-01-01, about 3.1 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM issued?
The CCADB lists 15: 6 valid, 2 expired and 7 revoked. The newest valid one is AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS G2R, valid until 2029-12-16.
Is AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM cross-signed?
No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.
Other roots from FNMT (Spain)
- AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS ECDSA P-384 · 2043-12-20
- AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS G2R RSA 4096 · 2040-12-12
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV