Root certificate · Department of Defence Australia

Australian Defence Public Root CA

Australian Defence Public Root CA is a root CA certificate operated by Department of Defence Australia (RSA 2048, valid until 2036-11-28, SHA-256 209E956A). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 1 of 4 major root stores: Microsoft.

Data updated Nov 10, 2026

Root store status

Root store	Status	Trusted for TLS	Distrust for TLS after	Constrained
Chrome	Not included Not included	No	—	No
Mozilla	Not included Not included	No	—	No
Apple	Not included Not included	No	—	No
Microsoft	Included Included	Yes	—	Yes

The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for Australian Defence Public Root CA.

Not included Chrome

Status: Not included

Not included Mozilla

Status: Not included

Not included Apple

Status: Not included

Included Microsoft

Status: Included
Trusted EKUs: Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Encrypting File System, IP Security Tunnel Termination, IP Security User, Secure Email, Time Stamping, IP Security End System
Not-before cutoff: 2020-06-01 (Code Signing)

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner: Department of Defence Australia
Subject: CN=Australian Defence Public Root CA,OU=CAs,OU=PKI,OU=DoD,O=GOV,C=AU
SHA-256: 209E956AF04DF3996507C887D356230D6EB49FDBDD2D8A058FF50B8F80F690AA
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint): A9CAFE9DFD67F4145AD397D0E2F3050D198DE6EE
SPKI SHA-256: 4EF7DACF77EDB751F704035FB5C6C442351EC7220AF90BDF82FD047BD3C24187
Valid from: 2016-11-28
Expires: 2036-11-28
Key: RSA 2048
Signature algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Serial number: 29EB9233464F3241FF831900A9ADC4D9F8E3E27F
Country: AU
Trust bits (CCADB): Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email, Encrypting File System, Time Stamping, IP Security Tunnel Termination, IP Security User, IP Security End System
EV policy OIDs (CCADB): not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites: valid: https://www1.defence.gov.au/ · expired: https://www1.defence.gov.au/ · revoked: https://www1.defence.gov.au/
CCADB record: A004097
PEM: defence-australia-australian-defence-public-root-ca.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists no intermediate CA certificate signed directly by Australian Defence Public Root CA.

Cross-signed versions

No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as Australian Defence Public Root CA with a different issuer, so a client has to carry Australian Defence Public Root CA itself in its root store to trust it.

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

Australian Defence Public Root CA itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

https://crl.defence.gov.au/pki/crl/ADPRCA.crl

What happens when it expires

Australian Defence Public Root CA is valid until 2036-11-28, about 10.1 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Australian Defence Public Root CA by common name (Australian Defence Public Root CA) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Not included)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "Australian Defence Public Root CA" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 209E956AF04DF3996507C887D356230D6EB49FDBDD2D8A058FF50B8F80F690AA

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root A9CAFE9DFD67F4145AD397D0E2F3050D198DE6EE

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Not included)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Australian Defence Public Root CA"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Australian Defence Public Root CA"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "20:9E:95:6A:F0:4D:F3:99:65:07:C8:87:D3:56:23:0D:6E:B4:9F:DB:DD:2D:8A:05:8F:F5:0B:8F:80:F6:90:AA"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for GOV → Australian Defence Public Root CA.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in defence-australia-australian-defence-public-root-ca.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=20:9E:95:6A:F0:4D:F3:99:65:07:C8:87:D3:56:23:0D:6E:B4:9F:DB:DD:2D:8A:05:8F:F5:0B:8F:80:F6:90:AA

FAQ

Is Australian Defence Public Root CA trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

As of 2026-11-10, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Chrome, Mozilla, Apple do not.

When does Australian Defence Public Root CA expire?

On 2036-11-28, about 10.1 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has Australian Defence Public Root CA issued?

The CCADB lists no intermediate certificate signed directly by Australian Defence Public Root CA.

Is Australian Defence Public Root CA cross-signed?

No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.

Sources

CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV