Root certificate · Cybertrust Japan
SecureSign Root CA14
SecureSign Root CA14 is a root CA certificate operated by Cybertrust Japan (RSA 4096, valid until 2045-04-08, SHA-256 4B009C10). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 2 of 4 major root stores: Mozilla, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Not included Not included | No | — | No |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Not included Not included | No | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | Yes |
Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.23.140.1.1.
Not included Chrome
- Status
- Not included
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites
- EV policy OIDs
- 2.23.140.1.1
- First included in
- NSS 3.104 / Firefox 131
Not included Apple
- Status
- Not included
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Secure Email
- Not-before cutoff
- 2026-05-19 (Secure Email)
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Cybertrust Japan / JCSI
- Subject
- CN=SecureSign Root CA14,O=Cybertrust Japan Co.\, Ltd.,C=JP
- SHA-256
4B009C1034494F9AB56BBA3BA1D62731FC4D20D8955ADCEC10A925607261E338- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
DD50C0F779B3642E74A2B89D9FD340DDBBF0F24F- SPKI SHA-256
581CC15821169694C39C2991B53E93AB945A42B076661774C2ECF38A3323ACEA- Valid from
- 2020-04-08
- Expires
- 2045-04-08
- Key
- RSA 4096
- Signature algorithm
- sha384WithRSAEncryption
- Serial number
64DB5A0C204EE8D72977C85027A25A27DD2DF2CB- Country
- JP
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- 2.23.140.1.1 · TLS EV capable: Yes
- Test websites
- valid:
https://ss14-valid.managedpki.ne.jp· expired:https://ss14-expired.managedpki.ne.jp· revoked:https://ss14-revoked.managedpki.ne.jp - CCADB record
- A006997
- PEM
- cybertrust-japan-securesign-root-ca14.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 9 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by SecureSign Root CA14: 1 currently valid, 0 expired and 8 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 9 of 9: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G9 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2030-06-22 | Valid |
| Cybertrust Japan SureTime CA G3 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2037-09-09 | Revoked |
| Cybertrust Japan SureTime CA G3 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2036-06-22 | Revoked |
| Cybertrust Japan SureCode CA G3 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2036-06-22 | Revoked |
| Cybertrust Japan SureCode EV CA G3 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2036-06-22 | Revoked |
| Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G6 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2030-06-03 | Revoked |
| Cybertrust Japan SureCode CA G1 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2036-04-09 | Revoked |
| Cybertrust Japan SureTime CA G1 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2036-04-09 | Revoked |
| Cybertrust Japan SureCode EV CA G1 | Cybertrust Japan / JCSI | 2036-04-09 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as SecureSign Root CA14 with a different issuer, so a client has to carry SecureSign Root CA14 itself in its root store to trust it.
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
SecureSign Root CA14 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://rtcrl.cybertrust.ne.jp/SecureSign/rtca14/cdp.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 1 valid intermediates signed by SecureSign Root CA14; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://rtcrl.cybertrust.ne.jp/SecureSign/rtca14/cdp.crl(1) - OCSP:
http://rtocsp.cybertrust.ne.jp/OcspServer(1)
What happens when it expires
SecureSign Root CA14 is valid until 2045-04-08, about 18.4 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up SecureSign Root CA14 by common name (SecureSign Root CA14) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Not included)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "SecureSign Root CA14" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 4B009C1034494F9AB56BBA3BA1D62731FC4D20D8955ADCEC10A925607261E338
Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root DD50C0F779B3642E74A2B89D9FD340DDBBF0F24F
Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "SecureSign Root CA14"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "SecureSign Root CA14"
Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "4B:00:9C:10:34:49:4F:9A:B5:6B:BA:3B:A1:D6:27:31:FC:4D:20:D8:95:5A:DC:EC:10:A9:25:60:72:61:E3:38"
Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Cybertrust Japan Co., Ltd. → SecureSign Root CA14.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in cybertrust-japan-securesign-root-ca14.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=4B:00:9C:10:34:49:4F:9A:B5:6B:BA:3B:A1:D6:27:31:FC:4D:20:D8:95:5A:DC:EC:10:A9:25:60:72:61:E3:38
FAQ
Is SecureSign Root CA14 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
As of 2026-11-10, Mozilla, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Chrome, Apple do not.
When does SecureSign Root CA14 expire?
On 2045-04-08, about 18.4 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has SecureSign Root CA14 issued?
The CCADB lists 9: 1 valid, 0 expired and 8 revoked. The newest valid one is Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G9, valid until 2030-06-22.
Is SecureSign Root CA14 cross-signed?
No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.
Other roots from Cybertrust Japan
- SecureSign Root CA15 ECDSA P-384 · 2045-04-08
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV