Root certificate · Chunghwa Telecom
ePKI Root Certification Authority
ePKI Root Certification Authority is a root CA certificate operated by Chunghwa Telecom (RSA 4096, valid until 2034-12-20, SHA-256 C0A6F4DC). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 2 of 4 major root stores: Apple, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Removed Removed | No | — | No |
| Mozilla | Removed Removed | No | — | Yes |
| Apple | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | Yes |
The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for ePKI Root Certification Authority.
Removed Chrome
- Status
- Removed
Removed Mozilla
- Status
- Removed
Included Apple
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection, timeStamping, codeSigning
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Encrypting File System, IP Security IKE Intermediate, IP Security Tunnel Termination, IP Security User, OCSP Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Chunghwa Telecom
- Subject
- OU=ePKI Root Certification Authority,O=Chunghwa Telecom Co.\, Ltd.,C=TW
- SHA-256
C0A6F4DC63A24BFDCF54EF2A6A082A0A72DE35803E2FF5FF527AE5D87206DFD5- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
67650DF17E8E7E5B8240A4F4564BCFE23D69C6F0- SPKI SHA-256
62554C17005543B237215F04268DCD2FD1C470240AD3C8660E25AE2C59630F55- Valid from
- 2004-12-20
- Expires
- 2034-12-20
- Key
- RSA 4096
- Signature algorithm
- sha1WithRSAEncryption
- Serial number
15C8BD65475CAFB897005EE406D2BC9D- Country
- TW
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping, IP Security IKE Intermediate
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
- Test websites
- valid:
https://good.epkiov.hinet.net· expired:https://expired.epkiov.hinet.net· revoked:https://revoked.epkiov.hinet.net - CCADB record
- A000135
- PEM
- chunghwa-telecom-epki-root-ca.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 10 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by ePKI Root Certification Authority: 2 currently valid, 0 expired and 8 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 10 of 10: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public Certification Authority - G2 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2034-12-11 | Valid |
| Public Certification Authority - G2 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2034-12-11 | Valid |
| HiPKI Root CA - G1 → HiPKI Root CA - G1 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2034-12-19 | Revoked |
| ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2034-12-20 | Revoked |
| ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2034-12-20 | Revoked |
| ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2034-12-20 | Revoked |
| ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2034-12-20 | Revoked |
| Public Certification Authority | Chunghwa Telecom | 2027-05-16 | Revoked |
| Public Certification Authority | Chunghwa Telecom | 2027-05-16 | Revoked |
| 中華電信憑證管理中心 | Chunghwa Telecom | 2025-08-30 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
3 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as ePKI Root Certification Authority but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not ePKI Root Certification Authority, can still build a chain.
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
ePKI Root Certification Authority itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://eca.hinet.net/repository/CRL_SHA2/CA.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 2 valid intermediates signed by ePKI Root Certification Authority; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://eca.hinet.net/repository/CRL_SHA2/CA.crl(2) - OCSP:
http://ocsp.eca.hinet.net/OCSP/ocspG1sha2(2)
What happens when it expires
ePKI Root Certification Authority is valid until 2034-12-20, about 8.1 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up ePKI Root Certification Authority by common name (ePKI Root Certification Authority) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "ePKI Root Certification Authority" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: C0A6F4DC63A24BFDCF54EF2A6A082A0A72DE35803E2FF5FF527AE5D87206DFD5
Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root 67650DF17E8E7E5B8240A4F4564BCFE23D69C6F0
Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Removed)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "ePKI Root Certification Authority"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "ePKI Root Certification Authority"
Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "C0:A6:F4:DC:63:A2:4B:FD:CF:54:EF:2A:6A:08:2A:0A:72:DE:35:80:3E:2F:F5:FF:52:7A:E5:D8:72:06:DF:D5"
Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. → ePKI Root Certification Authority.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in chunghwa-telecom-epki-root-ca.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=C0:A6:F4:DC:63:A2:4B:FD:CF:54:EF:2A:6A:08:2A:0A:72:DE:35:80:3E:2F:F5:FF:52:7A:E5:D8:72:06:DF:D5
FAQ
Is ePKI Root Certification Authority trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
As of 2026-11-10, Apple, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Chrome, Mozilla do not.
When does ePKI Root Certification Authority expire?
On 2034-12-20, about 8.1 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has ePKI Root Certification Authority issued?
The CCADB lists 10: 2 valid, 0 expired and 8 revoked. The newest valid one is Public Certification Authority - G2, valid until 2034-12-11.
Is ePKI Root Certification Authority cross-signed?
Yes. The CCADB has 3 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2; 0 of them are still valid.
Other roots from Chunghwa Telecom
- HiPKI Root CA - G1 RSA 4096 · 2037-12-31
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV