Root certificate · Certum
Certum EC-384 CA
Certum EC-384 CA is a root CA certificate operated by Certum (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2043-03-26, SHA-256 6B328085). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 4 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple, Microsoft.
Root store status
| Root store | Status | Trusted for TLS | Distrust for TLS after | Constrained |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Mozilla | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Apple | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
| Microsoft | Included Included | Yes | — | No |
Mozilla treats it as an EV root for policy OID 2.23.140.1.1.
Included Chrome
- Status
- Included
Included Mozilla
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- Websites, Email
- EV policy OIDs
- 2.23.140.1.1
- First included in
- NSS 3.66 / Firefox 90
- Inclusion bug
- #1598577
Included Apple
- Status
- Included
- Trust bits
- serverAuth, clientAuth, emailProtection
Included Microsoft
- Status
- Included
- Trusted EKUs
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.
Details
- CA owner
- Asseco Data Systems S.A.
- Subject
- CN=Certum EC-384 CA,OU=Certum Certification Authority,O=Asseco Data Systems S.A.,C=PL
- SHA-256
6B328085625318AA50D173C98D8BDA09D57E27413D114CF787A0F5D06C030CF6- SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint)
F33E783CACDFF4A2CCAC67556956D7E5163CE1ED- SPKI SHA-256
DE7B6932E9C44582CE0DE07ABDAB7EEA90C75D6D2A07331DF57BD5CB88553D13- Valid from
- 2018-03-26
- Expires
- 2043-03-26
- Key
- ECDSA P-384
- Signature algorithm
- ecdsa-with-SHA384
- Serial number
788F275C81125220A504D02DDDBA73F4- Country
- PL
- Trust bits (CCADB)
- Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Code Signing, Secure Email, Time Stamping
- EV policy OIDs (CCADB)
- 2.23.140.1.1 · TLS EV capable: Yes
- Test websites
- valid:
https://valid-cec384ca.certificates.certum.pl· expired:https://expired-cec384ca.certificates.certum.pl· revoked:https://revoked-cec384ca.certificates.certum.pl - CCADB record
- A006708
- PEM
- certum-ec-384-ca.pem
Intermediate CAs issued by this root
The CCADB lists 14 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Certum EC-384 CA: 13 currently valid, 0 expired and 1 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).
Showing 14 of 14: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.
| Intermediate | Operated by | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| netartSSL DV TLS G2 E31 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2031-06-06 | Valid |
| Certum TLS ECC Root CA → Certum TLS ECC Root CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2036-04-15 | Valid |
| Trustgate SMIME G2 E31 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2031-05-16 | Valid |
| WhiteSSL DV TLS G2 E36 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2036-01-02 | Valid |
| Certum Client Authentication G2 E40 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2040-06-03 | Valid |
| TrustAsia OV TLS ECC CA C5 | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2035-01-03 | Valid |
| TrustAsia EV TLS ECC CA C5 | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2035-01-03 | Valid |
| nazwaSSL DV TLS G2 E29 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2029-08-14 | Valid |
| Certum OV TLS G2 E39 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2039-06-05 | Valid |
| Certum DV TLS G2 E39 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2039-06-05 | Valid |
| Certum EV TLS G2 E39 CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2039-06-05 | Valid |
| Certum SMIME ECC CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2038-07-23 | Valid |
| Certum Extended Validation ECC CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2034-10-17 | Valid |
| Certum TLS ECC Root CA | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2036-04-15 | Revoked |
Cross-signed versions
1 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as Certum EC-384 CA but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not Certum EC-384 CA, can still build a chain.
| Signed by | CA owner | Expires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certum Trusted Network CA crt.sh | Asseco Data Systems S.A. | 2028-09-19 | Valid |
CRL and OCSP addresses
In the root certificate
Certum EC-384 CA itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.
Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)
http://crl.certum.pl/cec384ca.crlhttp://subca.crl.certum.pl/cec384ca.crl
Used by the intermediates it issued
Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 13 valid intermediates signed by Certum EC-384 CA; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.
- CRL:
http://subca.crl.certum.pl/cec384ca.crl(12) - CRL:
http://crl.certum.pl/cec384ca.crl(1) - OCSP:
http://subca.ocsp-certum.com(13)
What happens when it expires
Certum EC-384 CA is valid until 2043-03-26, about 16.4 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.
Check whether your device trusts it
Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Certum EC-384 CA by common name (Certum EC-384 CA) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.
macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.
security find-certificate -a -c "Certum EC-384 CA" -Z \
/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 6B328085625318AA50D173C98D8BDA09D57E27413D114CF787A0F5D06C030CF6Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.
certutil -verifystore Root F33E783CACDFF4A2CCAC67556956D7E5163CE1EDLinux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.
# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Certum EC-384 CA"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Certum EC-384 CA"Java
Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.
keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "6B:32:80:85:62:53:18:AA:50:D1:73:C9:8D:8B:DA:09:D5:7E:27:41:3D:11:4C:F7:87:A0:F5:D0:6C:03:0C:F6"Android
Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Asseco Data Systems S.A. → Certum EC-384 CA.
Which root does my site chain to?
List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.
# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
| grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in certum-ec-384-ca.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=6B:32:80:85:62:53:18:AA:50:D1:73:C9:8D:8B:DA:09:D5:7E:27:41:3D:11:4C:F7:87:A0:F5:D0:6C:03:0C:F6FAQ
Is Certum EC-384 CA trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?
Yes. As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla (Firefox), Apple (Safari) and Microsoft (Windows) all trust it for TLS server authentication.
When does Certum EC-384 CA expire?
On 2043-03-26, about 16.4 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.
How many intermediate certificates has Certum EC-384 CA issued?
The CCADB lists 14: 13 valid, 0 expired and 1 revoked. The newest valid one is netartSSL DV TLS G2 E31 CA, valid until 2031-06-06.
Is Certum EC-384 CA cross-signed?
Yes. The CCADB has 1 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by Certum Trusted Network CA; 1 of them are still valid.
Other roots from Certum
- Certum TLS ECC Root CA ECDSA P-384 · 2048-01-26
- Certum TLS RSA Root CA RSA 4096 · 2048-01-26
- Certum Trusted Network CA RSA 2048 · 2029-12-31
- Certum Trusted Network CA 2 RSA 4096 · 2046-10-06
- Certum Trusted Root CA RSA 4096 · 2043-03-16
Sources
- CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
- CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
- CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
- CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV