Root certificate · Certainly LLC

Certainly Root E1

Certainly Root E1 is a root CA certificate operated by Certainly LLC (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2046-04-01, SHA-256 B4585F22). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 3 of 4 major root stores: Chrome, Mozilla, Apple.

Data updated Nov 10, 2026

Root store status

Root store	Status	Trusted for TLS	Distrust for TLS after	Constrained
Chrome	Included Included	Yes	—	No
Mozilla	Included Included	Yes	—	No
Apple	Included Included	Yes	—	No
Microsoft	Not included Not included	No	—	No

The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for Certainly Root E1.

Included Chrome

Status: Included

Included Mozilla

Status: Included
Trust bits: Websites
EV policy OIDs: not EV-enabled
First included in: NSS 3.80 / Firefox 103
Inclusion bug: #1727941

Included Apple

Status: Included
Trust bits: serverAuth, clientAuth

Not included Microsoft

Status: Not included

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner: Certainly LLC
Subject: CN=Certainly Root E1,O=Certainly,C=US
SHA-256: B4585F22E4AC756A4E8612A1361C5D9D031A93FD84FEBB778FA3068B0FC42DC2
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint): F9E16DDC0189CFD58245633EC5377DC2EB936F2B
SPKI SHA-256: 1EF64625DAA2E5D433D7449AE31A200D1025E0012A8FECFA70932F8B599B75DD
Valid from: 2021-04-01
Expires: 2046-04-01
Key: ECDSA P-384
Signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
Serial number: 62533B1470333275CF98D9AB9BFCCF8
Country: US
Trust bits (CCADB): Server Authentication, Client Authentication
EV policy OIDs (CCADB): not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites: valid: https://valid.root-e1.certainly.com · expired: https://expired.root-e1.certainly.com · revoked: https://revoked.root-e1.certainly.com
CCADB record: A007890
PEM: certainly-root-e1.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists 1 intermediate CA certificates signed directly by Certainly Root E1: 1 currently valid, 0 expired and 0 revoked (revoked includes those whose parent was revoked).

Showing 1 of 1: valid certificates first, newest first. Each name links to its crt.sh entry by SHA-256; an arrow marks a cross-certificate for another root on this site.

Intermediate	Operated by	Expires	Status
Certainly Intermediate E1	Certainly LLC	2031-04-01	Valid

Cross-signed versions

No certificate in the CCADB has the same subject and public key as Certainly Root E1 with a different issuer, so a client has to carry Certainly Root E1 itself in its root store to trust it.

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

Certainly Root E1 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

http://crl.root-e1.certainly.com/

Used by the intermediates it issued

Addresses found in the CRL Distribution Points and OCSP fields of the 1 valid intermediates signed by Certainly Root E1; the number in brackets is how many of them use each address.

CRL: http://crl.root-e1.certainly.com/ (1)

None of the valid intermediates under this root lists an OCSP responder.

What happens when it expires

Certainly Root E1 is valid until 2046-04-01, about 19.4 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Certainly Root E1 by common name (Certainly Root E1) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "Certainly Root E1" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: B4585F22E4AC756A4E8612A1361C5D9D031A93FD84FEBB778FA3068B0FC42DC2

Windows (Microsoft store: Not included)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root F9E16DDC0189CFD58245633EC5377DC2EB936F2B

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Certainly Root E1"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Certainly Root E1"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "B4:58:5F:22:E4:AC:75:6A:4E:86:12:A1:36:1C:5D:9D:03:1A:93:FD:84:FE:BB:77:8F:A3:06:8B:0F:C4:2D:C2"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Certainly → Certainly Root E1.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in certainly-root-e1.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=B4:58:5F:22:E4:AC:75:6A:4E:86:12:A1:36:1C:5D:9D:03:1A:93:FD:84:FE:BB:77:8F:A3:06:8B:0F:C4:2D:C2

FAQ

Is Certainly Root E1 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

As of 2026-11-10, Chrome, Mozilla, Apple trust it for TLS server authentication; Microsoft do not.

When does Certainly Root E1 expire?

On 2046-04-01, about 19.4 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has Certainly Root E1 issued?

The CCADB lists 1: 1 valid, 0 expired and 0 revoked. The newest valid one is Certainly Intermediate E1, valid until 2031-04-01.

Is Certainly Root E1 cross-signed?

No. The CCADB has no certificate with the same subject and public key signed by another CA.

Other roots from Certainly LLC

Certainly Root R1 RSA 4096 · 2046-04-01

Sources

CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV