Root certificate · Actalis

Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025

Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 is a root CA certificate operated by Actalis (ECDSA P-384, valid until 2050-02-22, SHA-256 4EFAADA2). As of the latest CCADB data it is trusted for TLS server authentication by 1 of 4 major root stores: Microsoft.

Data updated Nov 10, 2026

Root store status

Root store	Status	Trusted for TLS	Distrust for TLS after	Constrained
Chrome	Not included Not included	No	—	No
Mozilla	Not included Not included	No	—	No
Apple	Not included Not included	No	—	No
Microsoft	Included Included	Yes	—	No

The CCADB lists no EV policy OID for Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025.

Not included Chrome

Status: Not included

Not included Mozilla

Status: Not included

Not included Apple

Status: Not included

Included Microsoft

Status: Included
Trusted EKUs: Server Authentication

"Trusted for TLS" means the store includes the root with the server-authentication trust bit (Mozilla "Websites", Apple serverAuth, Microsoft Server Authentication EKU). Microsoft "NotBefore" means only certificates issued before a cutoff date are still trusted. "Constrained" means the store applies extra restrictions.

Details

CA owner: Actalis
Subject: CN=Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025,O=Actalis S.p.A.,C=IT
SHA-256: 4EFAADA2543E1E02666998574B3BAD96AE264088FA5917F75D32E7A609D1869C
SHA-1 (Windows thumbprint): FC2E01CE1F63A4A43F542BF2C1D8E612E1826FEB
SPKI SHA-256: CCA4EB68C98622E2264879B61562EAD139559C91FE6B6AB3081EB19631426855
Valid from: 2025-02-28
Expires: 2050-02-22
Key: ECDSA P-384
Signature algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
Serial number: 3B1F6D5F9D28D851CA41F36F98EA56D1
Country: IT
Trust bits (CCADB): Server Authentication
EV policy OIDs (CCADB): not EV-enabled · TLS EV capable: No
Test websites: valid: https://active.ssltest-dv-ecc-2025.actalis.it · expired: https://expired.ssltest-dv-ecc-2025.actalis.it/ · revoked: https://revoked.ssltest-dv-ecc-2025.actalis.it/
CCADB record: A012757
PEM: actalis-tls-server-ecc-root-ca-2025.pem

Look up this certificate on crt.sh

Intermediate CAs issued by this root

The CCADB lists no intermediate CA certificate signed directly by Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025.

Cross-signed versions

2 certificate(s) in the CCADB have the same subject and public key as Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 but a different issuer. A server can send one of them so that clients which trust the issuing root, but not Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025, can still build a chain.

Signed by	CA owner	Expires	Status
Actalis Authentication Root CA crt.sh	Actalis	2030-09-22	Valid
Actalis Authentication Root CA crt.sh	Actalis	2030-09-22	Revoked

CRL and OCSP addresses

In the root certificate

Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 itself contains no CRL Distribution Points and no OCSP (Authority Information Access) extension. That is normal for a root: clients trust it directly and do not check its own revocation status.

Full CRL this CA publishes (CCADB)

http://crl13.actalis.it/Repository/tls-root-ecc-2025/getLastCRL

What happens when it expires

Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 is valid until 2050-02-22, about 23.3 years after this data snapshot (2026-11-10). From that day, browsers and operating systems that check trust-anchor expiry stop accepting chains that end at this root, so any certificate that can only chain to it fails validation. Android is a known exception: it does not enforce the expiry date of trust anchors.

Check whether your device trusts it

Each platform keeps its own root store. The commands below look up Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 by common name (Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025) or fingerprint. The store status in each heading comes from the CCADB snapshot; your device can differ if it is out of date or managed by an administrator.

macOS (Apple store: Not included)

Search the system roots keychain by common name. -Z prints the SHA-256 hash, which must match the fingerprint on the last line.

security find-certificate -a -c "Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025" -Z \
  /System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain | grep "SHA-256"
# SHA-256 hash: 4EFAADA2543E1E02666998574B3BAD96AE264088FA5917F75D32E7A609D1869C

Windows (Microsoft store: Included · Trusted for TLS)

Windows identifies roots by SHA-1 thumbprint. It installs third-party roots on demand through Automatic Root Certificates Update, so "not found" can also mean the root has not been needed yet; certutil -generateSSTFromWU roots.sst downloads Microsoft's full list.

certutil -verifystore Root FC2E01CE1F63A4A43F542BF2C1D8E612E1826FEB

Linux (ca-certificates follows Mozilla: Not included)

Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and RHEL build their ca-certificates package from Mozilla's root store. Use trust list on p11-kit systems, or search the PEM bundle on Debian and Ubuntu.

# Fedora / RHEL / Arch (p11-kit)
trust list --filter=ca-anchors | grep -iF -A2 "Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025"
# Debian / Ubuntu (ca-certificates)
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt \
  | openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout | grep -iF "Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025"

Java

Java ships its own cacerts keystore; JDK 9 and later accept -cacerts and the default store password is changeit. Search for the SHA-256 fingerprint in colon form.

keytool -list -cacerts -storepass changeit | grep -i "4E:FA:AD:A2:54:3E:1E:02:66:69:98:57:4B:3B:AD:96:AE:26:40:88:FA:59:17:F7:5D:32:E7:A6:09:D1:86:9C"

Android

Android's system store is maintained by Google separately from the four CCADB stores above. Open Settings → Security & privacy → More security settings → Encryption & credentials → Trusted credentials → System (menu names vary by vendor and version) and look for Actalis S.p.A. → Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025.

Which root does my site chain to?

List the chain your server sends and compare the last issuer with this root; the fingerprint check confirms a local copy.

Download PEM

# show subject (s:) and issuer (i:) of every certificate the server sends
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -E '^ *[0-9]+ s:|^ *i:'
# subject and SHA-256 fingerprint of the downloaded PEM file
openssl x509 -in actalis-tls-server-ecc-root-ca-2025.pem -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256
# sha256 Fingerprint=4E:FA:AD:A2:54:3E:1E:02:66:69:98:57:4B:3B:AD:96:AE:26:40:88:FA:59:17:F7:5D:32:E7:A6:09:D1:86:9C

FAQ

Is Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 trusted by Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Windows?

As of 2026-11-10, Microsoft trust it for TLS server authentication; Chrome, Mozilla, Apple do not.

When does Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 expire?

On 2050-02-22, about 23.3 years after the 2026-11-10 data snapshot.

How many intermediate certificates has Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 issued?

The CCADB lists no intermediate certificate signed directly by Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025.

Is Actalis TLS Server ECC Root CA 2025 cross-signed?

Yes. The CCADB has 2 cross-certificate(s) with its subject and key, signed by Actalis Authentication Root CA; 1 of them are still valid.

Other roots from Actalis

Actalis Authentication Root CA RSA 4096 · 2030-09-22
Actalis TLS Server RSA Root CA 2025 RSA 4096 · 2050-02-22

Sources

CCADB — Resources (TLS Server Authentication report, All Included Root Certificate Trust Bit Settings)
CCADB — All Certificate Information (root and intermediate), CSV V5
CCADB — Mozilla Included CA Certificate Report
CCADB — Chrome / Mozilla / Apple / Microsoft TLS Server Authentication CSV