TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384

What each component means

A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 combines RSA key exchange, PSK authentication, Camellia-256-GCM encryption and AEAD integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.

Key exchange: RSA_PSK (RFC 4279). The server authenticates with an RSA certificate and the client with a pre-shared key; the client encrypts part of the premaster secret with the server's RSA public key. Like plain RSA key exchange it has no forward secrecy.

Encryption: Camellia with a 256-bit key, a 128-bit block cipher designed in 2000 by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric and adopted by Japan's CRYPTREC and ISO/IEC 18033-3. It is considered as strong as AES but rarely has hardware acceleration, so few clients offer it. TLS suites arrived in RFC 4132 (2005), replaced by RFC 5932 (2010), with GCM variants in RFC 6367 (2011).

Mode: GCM (Galois/Counter Mode), an AEAD: counter-mode encryption plus a GHASH authenticator with a 16-byte tag, checked in one step, so the CBC padding attacks don't apply. In TLS 1.2 the 12-byte nonce is a 4-byte implicit salt from the key block plus an 8-byte explicit part sent with every record, as first specified for AES-GCM in RFC 5288 (2008); a nonce must never repeat under the same key.

Integrity: there is no separate MAC because the AEAD tag authenticates every record. The SHA384 at the end of the name selects the TLS 1.2 PRF hash used to derive keys and compute the Finished messages.

Why this rating

ssl.sh rating: Weak. The reasons:

• No forward secrecy: the session keys are protected by the server's long-term key (static RSA/DH/ECDH, PSK or Kerberos), so a leaked key decrypts recorded traffic.

How ssl.sh rates cipher suites

Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. Also implemented by: GnuTLS.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

History and standards status

TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xC0,0x93) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 6367, “Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (September 2011, Informational) as its specification. RFC 10015 (2026) now says clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select RSA key-exchange suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache

OpenSSL 3.5 doesn't implement this suite, so stock Nginx and Apache httpd builds can't offer it and you don't need to disable it.

How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 in its output:

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com

To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.