Cipher suite · 0xC0,0xA8
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 (0xC0,0xA8) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.2: PSK key exchange, PSK authentication, AES-128-CCM-8 encryption and AEAD message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Weak.
Details
- IANA name
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8- Hex code
0xC0,0xA8(49320)- OpenSSL
PSK-AES128-CCM8- GnuTLS
TLS_PSK_AES_128_CCM_8(min. TLS 1.2)- Key exchange
- PSK
- Authentication
- PSK
- Encryption
- AES-128-CCM-8 AEAD
- MAC
- AEAD · hash SHA256
- TLS versions
- TLS 1.2
- IANA "Recommended"
- N — not evaluated or not recommended · DTLS-OK: Y
- References
- RFC 6655
What each component means
A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 combines PSK key exchange, PSK authentication, AES-128-CCM-8 encryption and AEAD integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.
Key exchange and authentication: pre-shared key (PSK), defined in RFC 4279 (2005). Both sides already hold the same symmetric secret, provisioned out of band, and the handshake only names which key to use (the PSK identity). No certificates and no public-key operations are needed, which is why PSK suites appear in constrained devices and closed systems rather than on the public web. Plain PSK has no forward secrecy: whoever learns the key can decrypt every session made with it.
Encryption: AES with a 128-bit key, the 128-bit block cipher of FIPS 197 (2001). Most server and phone CPUs have AES instructions (AES-NI on x86, the ARMv8 cryptography extensions), which make it fast and avoid the cache-timing leaks of table-based software implementations.
Mode: CCM_8, AES-CCM with the authentication tag cut from 16 to 8 bytes (RFC 6655). That saves 8 bytes per record on constrained links, but a forged record now passes with probability 2^-64 per attempt instead of 2^-128, and no CCM_8 suite is marked Recommended in the IANA registry.
Integrity: there is no separate MAC because the AEAD tag authenticates every record. The SHA256 at the end of the name selects the TLS 1.2 PRF hash used to derive keys and compute the Finished messages.
Why this rating
ssl.sh rating: Weak. The reasons:
- No forward secrecy: the session keys are protected by the server's long-term key (static RSA/DH/ECDH, PSK or Kerberos), so a leaked key decrypts recorded traffic.
Which TLS libraries support it
Support for TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.
| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Implemented | cipher string PSK-AES128-CCM8 |
| GnuTLS | Implemented | name TLS_PSK_AES_128_CCM_8; minimum protocol TLS 1.2 |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | |
| Firefox | Not supported | |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported |
None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. Also implemented by: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS.
NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.
History and standards status
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 (0xC0,0xA8) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 6655, “AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (July 2012, Standards Track) as its specification. The registry marks it N, which per RFC 8447 (2018) means it either hasn't been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability or is meant only for specific use cases, not necessarily that it is flawed.
Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache
Disable
Either leave the suite out of your list or exclude it explicitly with a leading "!". Reload the server afterwards (nginx -s reload, apachectl graceful).
# Nginx
ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!PSK-AES128-CCM8';
# Apache httpd (mod_ssl)
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!PSK-AES128-CCM8
How to test whether a server accepts it
Offer only TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 with openssl s_client; if the handshake completes, the server accepts it:
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-AES128-CCM8 </dev/null
If the handshake succeeds, the server accepts the suite; "no cipher match" or a handshake failure means it doesn't.
nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 in its output:
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.
FAQ
Is TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 secure?
Only with caveats: ssl.sh rates it weak. No forward secrecy: the session keys are protected by the server's long-term key (static RSA/DH/ECDH, PSK or Kerberos), so a leaked key decrypts recorded traffic.
Can TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 be used with TLS 1.3?
No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 works with TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.
How do I disable TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 in Nginx or Apache?
Exclude it by its OpenSSL name: append !PSK-AES128-CCM8 to ssl_ciphers in Nginx or to SSLCipherSuite in Apache httpd. Listing only the suites you want, as in the snippet above, works even better. Reload the server and repeat the openssl s_client test to confirm the handshake now fails.
Which clients and libraries still support TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8?
Implemented, default state not tracked here: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS. Not supported: BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.
Better alternatives
Other suites with AES-128-CCM-8
| IANA name | Kx | Au | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | RSA | RSA | |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | DHE | RSA | |
| TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | DHE | PSK | |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | ECDHE | ECDSA | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 | ECDHE | PSK |
Sources
- IANA — TLS Cipher Suites registry
- OpenSSL 3.5 — openssl-ciphers(1)
- GnuTLS — lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c
- BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main) (2026-11-10)
- Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master) (2026-11-10)
- Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master) (2026-11-10)
- NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox) (2026-11-10)
- NSS — TAG-INFO (2026-11-10)
- Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp (2026-11-10)
- Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml (2026-11-10)
- Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites (2026-11-10)
- Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms (2026-11-10)
- Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11 (2026-11-10)
- Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022 (2026-11-10)
- docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider) (2026-11-10)
- RFC Editor — RFC index
- Nmap — ssl-enum-ciphers