Cipher suite · 0x00,0x20
TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x00,0x20) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2: KRB5 key exchange, KRB5 authentication, RC4-128 encryption and SHA1 message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Insecure.
Details
- IANA name
TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA- Hex code
0x00,0x20(32)- OpenSSL
- Not available in OpenSSL 3.5
- GnuTLS
- Not implemented in GnuTLS
- Key exchange
- KRB5
- Authentication
- KRB5
- Encryption
- RC4-128
- MAC
- SHA1
- TLS versions
- TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2
- IANA "Recommended"
- D — discouraged · DTLS-OK: N
- References
- RFC 2712, RFC 6347, RFC 9847
What each component means
A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA combines KRB5 key exchange, KRB5 authentication, RC4-128 encryption and SHA1 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.
Key exchange and authentication: Kerberos (RFC 2712). Instead of a certificate exchange, the client presents a Kerberos service ticket and the premaster secret is protected with the ticket's session key, so TLS can reuse existing Kerberos infrastructure. These suites were only ever defined with DES, 3DES, RC4, IDEA and 40-bit export ciphers, so no modern combination exists, and OpenSSL 3.5 implements none of them.
Encryption: RC4, a stream cipher whose keystream is measurably biased. AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt showed in 2013 that a secret such as a cookie can be recovered from enough encryptions of it, and RFC 7465 (2015) then prohibited RC4 suites outright: clients MUST NOT offer them and servers MUST NOT select them.
Integrity: HMAC-SHA1. SHA-1 collisions are practical (SHAttered, 2017), but HMAC does not rely on collision resistance, so HMAC-SHA1 record MACs are not considered broken; this suite's weak points lie elsewhere. When TLS 1.2 is negotiated, keys are derived with the SHA-256 PRF, which RFC 5246 (2008) applies to every cipher suite defined before it.
Why this rating
ssl.sh rating: Insecure. The reasons:
- Uses RC4, which RFC 7465 prohibits in all TLS versions because of practical biases in its keystream.
Which TLS libraries support it
Support for TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.
| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Not supported | |
| GnuTLS | Not supported | |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | |
| Firefox | Not supported | |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported |
None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. None of them implements it.
NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.
History and standards status
TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x00,0x20) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 2712, “Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (October 1999, Standards Track) as its specification. DTLS 1.2 (RFC 6347, January 2012) had already said RC4 MUST NOT be used with DTLS. RFC 7465 (2015) prohibits RC4 cipher suites in every TLS version: clients MUST NOT offer them and servers MUST NOT select them. The registry marks it D (discouraged), a value introduced by RFC 9847 (2025).
Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache
OpenSSL 3.5 doesn't implement this suite, so stock Nginx and Apache httpd builds can't offer it and you don't need to disable it.
How to test whether a server accepts it
OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.
nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA in its output:
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.
FAQ
Is TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA secure?
No. ssl.sh rates it insecure. Uses RC4, which RFC 7465 prohibits in all TLS versions because of practical biases in its keystream. RFC 7465 (2015) prohibits RC4 cipher suites in every TLS version: clients MUST NOT offer them and servers MUST NOT select them.
Can TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA be used with TLS 1.3?
No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA works with TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.
How do I disable TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA in Nginx or Apache?
There is nothing to disable: OpenSSL 3.5, which Nginx and Apache httpd normally use, does not implement TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, so they cannot negotiate it.
Which clients and libraries still support TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA?
Not supported: OpenSSL 3.5, GnuTLS, BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.
Better alternatives
Other suites with RC4-128
| IANA name | Kx | Au | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | RSA | RSA | |
| TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | PSK | PSK | |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | DHE | PSK | |
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | RSA | PSK | |
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | ECDH | ECDSA | |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | ECDHE | ECDSA | |
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | ECDH | RSA | |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | ECDHE | RSA | |
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | ECDH | anon | |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | ECDHE | PSK |
Sources
- IANA — TLS Cipher Suites registry
- OpenSSL 3.5 — openssl-ciphers(1)
- GnuTLS — lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c
- BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main) (2026-11-10)
- Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master) (2026-11-10)
- Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master) (2026-11-10)
- NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox) (2026-11-10)
- NSS — TAG-INFO (2026-11-10)
- Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp (2026-11-10)
- Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml (2026-11-10)
- Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites (2026-11-10)
- Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms (2026-11-10)
- Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11 (2026-11-10)
- Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022 (2026-11-10)
- docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider) (2026-11-10)
- RFC Editor — RFC index
- Nmap — ssl-enum-ciphers