TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256

What each component means

A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 combines ECDH key exchange, RSA authentication, ARIA-128-GCM encryption and AEAD integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.

Key exchange: static ECDH. The server's elliptic-curve DH key is fixed in its certificate, so there is no forward secrecy, and a server that reuses one ECDH key without validating the client's point is open to invalid-curve attacks (Jager, Schwenk and Somorovsky, 2015). The RSA in the name is the algorithm the CA used to sign the ECDH certificate, not a signature made during the handshake.

Encryption: ARIA with a 128-bit key, a 128-bit block cipher developed in South Korea and standardised there as KS X 1213 in 2004. Its TLS suites come from the Informational RFC 6209 (2011), and support outside Korean government and financial systems is rare.

Mode: GCM (Galois/Counter Mode), an AEAD: counter-mode encryption plus a GHASH authenticator with a 16-byte tag, checked in one step, so the CBC padding attacks don't apply. In TLS 1.2 the 12-byte nonce is a 4-byte implicit salt from the key block plus an 8-byte explicit part sent with every record, as first specified for AES-GCM in RFC 5288 (2008); a nonce must never repeat under the same key.

Integrity: there is no separate MAC because the AEAD tag authenticates every record. The SHA256 at the end of the name selects the TLS 1.2 PRF hash used to derive keys and compute the Finished messages.

Why this rating

ssl.sh rating: Weak. The reasons:

• No forward secrecy: the session keys are protected by the server's long-term key (static RSA/DH/ECDH, PSK or Kerberos), so a leaked key decrypts recorded traffic.

How ssl.sh rates cipher suites

Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. None of them implements it.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

History and standards status

TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xC0,0x62) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 6209, “Addition of the ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (April 2011, Informational) as its specification. RFC 9325 (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate static DH or ECDH key agreement because neither has forward secrecy. RFC 10015 (2026) also says clients SHOULD NOT offer and servers SHOULD NOT select non-ephemeral ECDH suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache

OpenSSL 3.5 doesn't implement this suite, so stock Nginx and Apache httpd builds can't offer it and you don't need to disable it.

How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 in its output:

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com

To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.