TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

What each component means

A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 combines ECCPWD key exchange, ECCPWD authentication, AES-128-GCM encryption and AEAD integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.

Key exchange and authentication: ECCPWD, the password-based TLS-PWD exchange of RFC 8492 (2019), an Informational RFC. Both sides prove knowledge of a shared password through an elliptic-curve exchange designed to resist offline dictionary attacks, with no certificates involved. Its four suites (AES-GCM and AES-CCM with SHA-256 or SHA-384) are registered for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.

Encryption: AES with a 128-bit key, the 128-bit block cipher of FIPS 197 (2001). Most server and phone CPUs have AES instructions (AES-NI on x86, the ARMv8 cryptography extensions), which make it fast and avoid the cache-timing leaks of table-based software implementations.

Mode: GCM (Galois/Counter Mode), an AEAD: counter-mode encryption plus a GHASH authenticator with a 16-byte tag, checked in one step, so the CBC padding attacks don't apply. In TLS 1.2 the 12-byte nonce is a 4-byte implicit salt from the key block plus an 8-byte explicit part sent with every record, as first specified for AES-GCM in RFC 5288 (2008); a nonce must never repeat under the same key.

Integrity: there is no separate MAC because the AEAD tag authenticates every record. The SHA256 at the end of the name selects the TLS 1.2 PRF hash used to derive keys and compute the Finished messages.

Why this rating

ssl.sh rating: Secure. The reasons:

• Ephemeral key exchange (forward secrecy) plus an AEAD cipher, the combination TLS 1.2 best practice asks for.

How ssl.sh rates cipher suites

Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. None of them implements it.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

History and standards status

TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xC0,0xB0) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 8492, “Secure Password Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (February 2019, Informational) as its specification. The registry marks it N, which per RFC 8447 (2018) means it either hasn't been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability or is meant only for specific use cases, not necessarily that it is flawed.

Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache

OpenSSL 3.5 doesn't implement this suite, so stock Nginx and Apache httpd builds can't offer it and you don't need to disable it.

How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 in its output:

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com

To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.