TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256

What each component means

A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 combines DHE key exchange, PSK authentication, Camellia-128-CBC encryption and SHA256 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.

Key exchange: DHE_PSK. A pre-shared key authenticates both sides and an ephemeral finite-field Diffie-Hellman exchange is mixed into the premaster secret, so a PSK leaked later does not expose recorded sessions (forward secrecy). It was specified in RFC 4279 (2005) together with plain PSK and RSA_PSK.

Encryption: Camellia with a 128-bit key, a 128-bit block cipher designed in 2000 by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric and adopted by Japan's CRYPTREC and ISO/IEC 18033-3. It is considered as strong as AES but rarely has hardware acceleration, so few clients offer it. TLS suites arrived in RFC 4132 (2005), replaced by RFC 5932 (2010), with GCM variants in RFC 6367 (2011).

Mode: CBC with MAC-then-encrypt. TLS 1.2 and earlier compute the HMAC over the plaintext, then pad and encrypt, so a receiver has to decrypt before it can check integrity. That ordering produced a long run of padding-oracle attacks: BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) against TLS 1.0's predictable IVs, Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169, 2013), which times the MAC check, and POODLE (CVE-2014-3566, 2014) against SSL 3.0's unchecked padding. RFC 9325 (2022) says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless the encrypt_then_mac extension (RFC 7366) is also negotiated.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA256 over each record, computed before encryption (MAC-then-encrypt). In TLS 1.2 the SHA256 in the name also selects the PRF hash. Because of that, the suite needs TLS 1.2 and cannot be used with older versions.

Why this rating

ssl.sh rating: Weak. The reasons:

• CBC mode with a separate MAC (MAC-then-encrypt), the construction behind padding-oracle attacks such as Lucky Thirteen; prefer an AEAD cipher.

How ssl.sh rates cipher suites

Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. Also implemented by: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

History and standards status

TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xC0,0x96) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 6367, “Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (September 2011, Informational) as its specification. RFC 9325 (2022), part of BCP 195, says TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS_DHE_* suites, citing the Raccoon attack and the poor uptake of negotiated groups. RFC 10015 (2026) now says clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache

Disable

Either leave the suite out of your list or exclude it explicitly with a leading "!". Reload the server afterwards (nginx -s reload, apachectl graceful).

# Nginx
ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256';

# Apache httpd (mod_ssl)
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256

How to test whether a server accepts it

Offer only TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 with openssl s_client; if the handshake completes, the server accepts it:

openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_2 -cipher DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256 </dev/null

If the handshake succeeds, the server accepts the suite; "no cipher match" or a handshake failure means it doesn't.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 in its output:

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com

To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.