TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

What each component means

A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA combines DHE key exchange, DSS authentication, 3DES-EDE-CBC encryption and SHA1 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.

Key exchange: DHE, ephemeral finite-field Diffie-Hellman. A new DH key pair per handshake gives forward secrecy, but in TLS 1.2 the server alone picks the group and the client cannot ask for a stronger one; RFC 7919 (2016) added negotiated FFDHE groups, which saw little uptake. Logjam (CVE-2015-4000, 2015) broke servers that still accepted 512-bit export groups and showed that huge numbers of sites shared the same few 1024-bit primes, and the Raccoon timing attack (2020) exploits how TLS 1.2 strips leading zero bytes from the DH secret. Those are the reasons RFC 9325 (2022) gives for telling TLS 1.2 implementations not to negotiate TLS_DHE_* suites.

Authentication: DSS, meaning DSA certificates. Publicly trusted CAs only issue RSA and ECDSA certificates under the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, TLS 1.3 has no DSA signature scheme, and NIST's FIPS 186-5 (2023) no longer approves DSA for creating signatures, so DSS suites only survive in legacy private PKIs.

Encryption: 3DES (Triple DES, EDE) in CBC mode. Meet-in-the-middle attacks reduce its nominal 168-bit key to about 112 bits of security, and its 64-bit block is the real problem: Sweet32 (CVE-2016-2183, Bhargavan and Leurent, 2016) recovered an HTTP cookie after capturing about 785 GB on one long-lived connection, because block collisions become likely after roughly 2^32 blocks. NIST disallowed Triple DES for encryption after 2023.

Mode: CBC with MAC-then-encrypt. TLS 1.2 and earlier compute the HMAC over the plaintext, then pad and encrypt, so a receiver has to decrypt before it can check integrity. That ordering produced a long run of padding-oracle attacks: BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) against TLS 1.0's predictable IVs, Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169, 2013), which times the MAC check, and POODLE (CVE-2014-3566, 2014) against SSL 3.0's unchecked padding. RFC 9325 (2022) says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless the encrypt_then_mac extension (RFC 7366) is also negotiated.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA1. SHA-1 collisions are practical (SHAttered, 2017), but HMAC does not rely on collision resistance, so HMAC-SHA1 record MACs are not considered broken; this suite's weak points lie elsewhere. When TLS 1.2 is negotiated, keys are derived with the SHA-256 PRF, which RFC 5246 (2008) applies to every cipher suite defined before it.

Why this rating

ssl.sh rating: Insecure. The reasons:

• Uses 3DES, a 64-bit block cipher vulnerable to the Sweet32 birthday attack (CVE-2016-2183).

How ssl.sh rates cipher suites

Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

Enabled by default in 1 of the 9 libraries tracked here: NSS 3.133. Supported but off by default in: Java 21 (SunJSSE) and Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022). Also implemented by: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

History and standards status

TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x00,0x13) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 5246, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2” (August 2008, Standards Track) as its specification. RFC 5246 has since been obsoleted by RFC 8446 (2018) and RFC 9846 (2026). RFC 9325 (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate suites using algorithms with less than 128 bits of security, and counts 3DES at 112 bits. RFC 9325 (2022), part of BCP 195, says TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS_DHE_* suites, citing the Raccoon attack and the poor uptake of negotiated groups. RFC 10015 (2026) now says clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache

This suite is rated insecure, so we don't show how to enable it. Make sure it's excluded.

Disable

Either leave the suite out of your list or exclude it explicitly with a leading "!". Reload the server afterwards (nginx -s reload, apachectl graceful).

# Nginx
ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA';

# Apache httpd (mod_ssl)
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA

How to test whether a server accepts it

Offer only TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA with openssl s_client; if the handshake completes, the server accepts it:

openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_2 -cipher DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA </dev/null

If the handshake succeeds, the server accepts the suite; "no cipher match" or a handshake failure means it doesn't.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA in its output:

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com

To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.