Cipher suite · 0x00,0x9B

TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA

TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x00,0x9B) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2: DH key exchange, anon authentication, SEED-CBC encryption and SHA1 message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Insecure.

InsecureTLS 1.0TLS 1.1TLS 1.2Data updated

Details

IANA name
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
Hex code
0x00,0x9B (155)
OpenSSL
Not available in OpenSSL 3.5
GnuTLS
Not implemented in GnuTLS
Key exchange
DH
Authentication
anon
Encryption
SEED-CBC
MAC
SHA1
TLS versions
TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2
IANA "Recommended"
D — discouraged · DTLS-OK: Y
References
RFC 4162, RFC 10015

What each component means

A cipher suite names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA combines DH key exchange, anon authentication, SEED-CBC encryption and SHA1 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see how cipher suites work.

Key exchange: anonymous DH (anon). The server sends its Diffie-Hellman parameters with no certificate and no signature, so the client cannot tell whether it is talking to the real server. An active man-in-the-middle can run a separate anonymous handshake with each side and read or alter everything; encryption without authentication only stops passive eavesdroppers. Java's default jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms blocks every anon suite for this reason.

Encryption: SEED, a 128-bit block cipher with a 128-bit key developed in 1998 by the Korea Information Security Agency (KISA). RFC 4162 (2005) added it to TLS only in CBC mode with HMAC-SHA1, so it inherits every CBC weakness described below.

Mode: CBC with MAC-then-encrypt. TLS 1.2 and earlier compute the HMAC over the plaintext, then pad and encrypt, so a receiver has to decrypt before it can check integrity. That ordering produced a long run of padding-oracle attacks: BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) against TLS 1.0's predictable IVs, Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169, 2013), which times the MAC check, and POODLE (CVE-2014-3566, 2014) against SSL 3.0's unchecked padding. RFC 9325 (2022) says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless the encrypt_then_mac extension (RFC 7366) is also negotiated.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA1. SHA-1 collisions are practical (SHAttered, 2017), but HMAC does not rely on collision resistance, so HMAC-SHA1 record MACs are not considered broken; this suite's weak points lie elsewhere. When TLS 1.2 is negotiated, keys are derived with the SHA-256 PRF, which RFC 5246 (2008) applies to every cipher suite defined before it.

Why this rating

ssl.sh rating: Insecure. The reasons:

  • Anonymous key exchange without server authentication, so a man-in-the-middle can impersonate the server.

How ssl.sh rates cipher suites

Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

LibraryStatusDetails
OpenSSL 3.5Not supported
GnuTLSNot supported
BoringSSLNot supported
Go crypto/tlsNot supported
NSS 3.133Not supported
FirefoxNot supported
Java 21 (SunJSSE)Not supported
Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022)Not supported
rustls 0.23.46Not supported

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. None of them implements it.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

History and standards status

TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA (0x00,0x9B) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with RFC 4162, “Addition of SEED Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (September 2005, Standards Track) as its specification. RFC 9325 (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate static DH or ECDH key agreement because neither has forward secrecy. RFC 10015 (2026) now says clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select non-ephemeral FFDH suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

Enable or disable it in Nginx and Apache

OpenSSL 3.5 doesn't implement this suite, so stock Nginx and Apache httpd builds can't offer it and you don't need to disable it.

How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA in its output:

nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com

To decode a name or hex code, use the cipher suite lookup; the SSL checker shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

FAQ

Is TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA secure?

No. ssl.sh rates it insecure. Anonymous key exchange without server authentication, so a man-in-the-middle can impersonate the server. RFC 10015 (2026) now says clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select non-ephemeral FFDH suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

Can TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA works with TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

How do I disable TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA in Nginx or Apache?

There is nothing to disable: OpenSSL 3.5, which Nginx and Apache httpd normally use, does not implement TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, so they cannot negotiate it.

Which clients and libraries still support TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA?

Not supported: OpenSSL 3.5, GnuTLS, BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.

Better alternatives

Other suites with SEED-CBC

Sources

  1. IANA — TLS Cipher Suites registry
  2. OpenSSL 3.5 — openssl-ciphers(1)
  3. GnuTLS — lib/algorithms/ciphersuites.c
  4. BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main) (2026-11-10)
  5. Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master) (2026-11-10)
  6. Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master) (2026-11-10)
  7. NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox) (2026-11-10)
  8. NSS — TAG-INFO (2026-11-10)
  9. Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp (2026-11-10)
  10. Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml (2026-11-10)
  11. Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites (2026-11-10)
  12. Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms (2026-11-10)
  13. Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11 (2026-11-10)
  14. Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022 (2026-11-10)
  15. docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider) (2026-11-10)
  16. RFC Editor — RFC index
  17. Nmap — ssl-enum-ciphers