# TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 cipher suite

> TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xC0,0x65): PSK/PSK · ARIA-256-CBC · TLS 1.2. ssl.sh rating: Weak. OpenSSL/GnuTLS names and Nginx/Apache config.

Source: https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-psk-with-aria-256-cbc-sha384/
Last updated: 2026-11-10

TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xC0,0x65) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.2: PSK key exchange, PSK authentication, ARIA-256-CBC encryption and SHA384 message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Weak.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IANA | TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 |
| Hex code | 0xC0,0x65 |
| OpenSSL | Not available in OpenSSL 3.5 |
| GnuTLS | - |
| Key exchange | PSK |
| Authentication | PSK |
| Encryption | ARIA-256-CBC |
| MAC | SHA384 |
| TLS versions | TLS 1.2 |
| Rating | Weak |
| IANA "Recommended" | N |
| References | RFC 6209 |

## What each component means

A [cipher suite](https://ssl.sh/glossary/cipher-suite/) names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 combines PSK key exchange, PSK authentication, ARIA-256-CBC encryption and SHA384 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see [how cipher suites work](https://ssl.sh/learn/cipher-suites/).

Key exchange and authentication: [pre-shared key](https://ssl.sh/glossary/psk/) (PSK), defined in [RFC 4279](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4279) (2005). Both sides already hold the same symmetric secret, provisioned out of band, and the handshake only names which key to use (the PSK identity). No certificates and no public-key operations are needed, which is why PSK suites appear in constrained devices and closed systems rather than on the public web. Plain PSK has no [forward secrecy](https://ssl.sh/glossary/forward-secrecy/): whoever learns the key can decrypt every session made with it.

Encryption: ARIA with a 256-bit key, a 128-bit block cipher developed in South Korea and standardised there as KS X 1213 in 2004. Its TLS suites come from the Informational [RFC 6209](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6209) (2011), and support outside Korean government and financial systems is rare.

Mode: CBC with MAC-then-encrypt. TLS 1.2 and earlier compute the HMAC over the plaintext, then pad and encrypt, so a receiver has to decrypt before it can check integrity. That ordering produced a long run of padding-oracle attacks: [BEAST](https://ssl.sh/glossary/beast/) (CVE-2011-3389) against TLS 1.0's predictable IVs, Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169, 2013), which times the MAC check, and [POODLE](https://ssl.sh/glossary/poodle/) (CVE-2014-3566, 2014) against SSL 3.0's unchecked padding. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022) says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless the encrypt_then_mac extension ([RFC 7366](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7366)) is also negotiated.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA384 over each record, computed before encryption (MAC-then-encrypt). In TLS 1.2 the SHA384 in the name also selects the PRF hash. Because of that, the suite needs TLS 1.2 and cannot be used with older versions.

## Why this rating

- CBC mode with a separate MAC (MAC-then-encrypt), the construction behind padding-oracle attacks such as Lucky Thirteen; prefer an AEAD cipher.
- No forward secrecy: the session keys are protected by the server's long-term key (static RSA/DH/ECDH, PSK or Kerberos), so a leaked key decrypts recorded traffic.

## Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Not supported | - |
| GnuTLS | Not supported | - |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | - |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | - |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | - |
| Firefox | Not supported | - |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | - |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | - |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported | - |

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. None of them implements it.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

- [BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main)](https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/main/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/defaults.go) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox)](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — TAG-INFO](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/TAG-INFO) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/oracle-providers.html#GUID-7093246A-31A3-4304-AC5F-5FB6400405E2) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/java-secure-socket-extension-jsse-reference-guide.html) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-11) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-server-2022) (2026-11-10)
- [docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider)](https://docs.rs/rustls/0.23.46/src/rustls/crypto/aws_lc_rs/mod.rs.html) (2026-11-10)

## History and standards status

TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xC0,0x65) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with [RFC 6209](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6209), “Addition of the ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (April 2011, Informational) as its specification. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless encrypt_then_mac is negotiated. The registry marks it N, which per [RFC 8447](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8447) (2018) means it either hasn't been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability or is meant only for specific use cases, not necessarily that it is flawed.

## How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 in its output:

```bash
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
```

To decode a name or hex code, use the [cipher suite lookup](https://ssl.sh/tools/cipher-suite-lookup/); the [SSL checker](https://ssl.sh/tools/ssl-checker/) shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

## FAQ

### Is TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 secure?

Only with caveats: ssl.sh rates it weak. CBC mode with a separate MAC (MAC-then-encrypt), the construction behind padding-oracle attacks such as Lucky Thirteen; prefer an AEAD cipher. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless encrypt_then_mac is negotiated.

### Can TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 works with TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256](https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-aes-128-gcm-sha256/), which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

### How do I disable TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 in Nginx or Apache?

There is nothing to disable: OpenSSL 3.5, which Nginx and Apache httpd normally use, does not implement TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, so they cannot negotiate it.

### Which clients and libraries still support TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384?

Not supported: OpenSSL 3.5, GnuTLS, BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.