# TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite

> TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x00,0x1F): KRB5/KRB5 · 3DES-EDE-CBC · TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. ssl.sh rating: Insecure. OpenSSL/GnuTLS names and Nginx/Apache config.

Source: https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-krb5-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha/
Last updated: 2026-11-10

TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x00,0x1F) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2: KRB5 key exchange, KRB5 authentication, 3DES-EDE-CBC encryption and SHA1 message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Insecure.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IANA | TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA |
| Hex code | 0x00,0x1F |
| OpenSSL | Not available in OpenSSL 3.5 |
| GnuTLS | - |
| Key exchange | KRB5 |
| Authentication | KRB5 |
| Encryption | 3DES-EDE-CBC |
| MAC | SHA1 |
| TLS versions | TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 |
| Rating | Insecure |
| IANA "Recommended" | N |
| References | RFC 2712 |

## What each component means

A [cipher suite](https://ssl.sh/glossary/cipher-suite/) names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA combines KRB5 key exchange, KRB5 authentication, 3DES-EDE-CBC encryption and SHA1 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see [how cipher suites work](https://ssl.sh/learn/cipher-suites/).

Key exchange and authentication: Kerberos ([RFC 2712](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2712)). Instead of a certificate exchange, the client presents a Kerberos service ticket and the premaster secret is protected with the ticket's session key, so TLS can reuse existing Kerberos infrastructure. These suites were only ever defined with DES, 3DES, RC4, IDEA and 40-bit export ciphers, so no modern combination exists, and OpenSSL 3.5 implements none of them.

Encryption: [3DES](https://ssl.sh/glossary/3des/) (Triple DES, EDE) in CBC mode. Meet-in-the-middle attacks reduce its nominal 168-bit key to about 112 bits of security, and its 64-bit block is the real problem: [Sweet32](https://ssl.sh/glossary/sweet32/) (CVE-2016-2183, Bhargavan and Leurent, 2016) recovered an HTTP cookie after capturing about 785 GB on one long-lived connection, because block collisions become likely after roughly 2^32 blocks. NIST disallowed Triple DES for encryption after 2023.

Mode: CBC with MAC-then-encrypt. TLS 1.2 and earlier compute the HMAC over the plaintext, then pad and encrypt, so a receiver has to decrypt before it can check integrity. That ordering produced a long run of padding-oracle attacks: [BEAST](https://ssl.sh/glossary/beast/) (CVE-2011-3389) against TLS 1.0's predictable IVs, Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169, 2013), which times the MAC check, and [POODLE](https://ssl.sh/glossary/poodle/) (CVE-2014-3566, 2014) against SSL 3.0's unchecked padding. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022) says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless the encrypt_then_mac extension ([RFC 7366](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7366)) is also negotiated.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA1. [SHA-1](https://ssl.sh/glossary/sha-1/) collisions are practical (SHAttered, 2017), but HMAC does not rely on collision resistance, so HMAC-SHA1 record MACs are not considered broken; this suite's weak points lie elsewhere. When TLS 1.2 is negotiated, keys are derived with the SHA-256 PRF, which [RFC 5246](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246) (2008) applies to every cipher suite defined before it.

## Why this rating

- Uses 3DES, a 64-bit block cipher vulnerable to the Sweet32 birthday attack (CVE-2016-2183).

## Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Not supported | - |
| GnuTLS | Not supported | - |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | - |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | - |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | - |
| Firefox | Not supported | - |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | - |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | - |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported | - |

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. None of them implements it.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

- [BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main)](https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/main/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/defaults.go) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox)](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — TAG-INFO](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/TAG-INFO) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/oracle-providers.html#GUID-7093246A-31A3-4304-AC5F-5FB6400405E2) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/java-secure-socket-extension-jsse-reference-guide.html) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-11) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-server-2022) (2026-11-10)
- [docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider)](https://docs.rs/rustls/0.23.46/src/rustls/crypto/aws_lc_rs/mod.rs.html) (2026-11-10)

## History and standards status

TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x00,0x1F) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with [RFC 2712](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2712), “Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (October 1999, Standards Track) as its specification. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate suites using algorithms with less than 128 bits of security, and counts 3DES at 112 bits. The registry marks it N, which per [RFC 8447](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8447) (2018) means it either hasn't been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability or is meant only for specific use cases, not necessarily that it is flawed.

## How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA in its output:

```bash
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
```

To decode a name or hex code, use the [cipher suite lookup](https://ssl.sh/tools/cipher-suite-lookup/); the [SSL checker](https://ssl.sh/tools/ssl-checker/) shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

## FAQ

### Is TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA secure?

No. ssl.sh rates it insecure. Uses 3DES, a 64-bit block cipher vulnerable to the Sweet32 birthday attack (CVE-2016-2183). [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate suites using algorithms with less than 128 bits of security, and counts 3DES at 112 bits.

### Can TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA works with TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256](https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-aes-128-gcm-sha256/), which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

### How do I disable TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA in Nginx or Apache?

There is nothing to disable: OpenSSL 3.5, which Nginx and Apache httpd normally use, does not implement TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, so they cannot negotiate it.

### Which clients and libraries still support TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA?

Not supported: OpenSSL 3.5, GnuTLS, BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.