# TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite

> TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xC0,0x12): ECDHE/RSA · 3DES-EDE-CBC · TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. ssl.sh rating: Insecure. OpenSSL/GnuTLS names and Nginx/Apache config.

Source: https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-ecdhe-rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha/
Last updated: 2026-11-10

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xC0,0x12) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2: ECDHE key exchange, RSA authentication, 3DES-EDE-CBC encryption and SHA1 message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Insecure.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IANA | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA |
| Hex code | 0xC0,0x12 |
| OpenSSL | ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA |
| GnuTLS | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1 |
| Key exchange | ECDHE |
| Authentication | RSA |
| Encryption | 3DES-EDE-CBC |
| MAC | SHA1 |
| TLS versions | TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 |
| Rating | Insecure |
| IANA "Recommended" | N |
| References | RFC 8422 |

## What each component means

A [cipher suite](https://ssl.sh/glossary/cipher-suite/) names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA combines ECDHE key exchange, RSA authentication, 3DES-EDE-CBC encryption and SHA1 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see [how cipher suites work](https://ssl.sh/learn/cipher-suites/).

Key exchange: [ECDHE](https://ssl.sh/glossary/ecdhe/), ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman. Client and server create a fresh key pair on a named curve such as X25519 or P-256 for every handshake and discard it afterwards. Because the session keys never depend on the server's long-term private key alone, stealing that key later does not decrypt recorded traffic; this property is [forward secrecy](https://ssl.sh/glossary/forward-secrecy/). ECC cipher suites were first specified in [RFC 4492](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492) (2006); the current definition is [RFC 8422](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8422) (2018).

Authentication: the server proves its identity with an [RSA](https://ssl.sh/glossary/rsa/) certificate, signing the handshake's key-exchange parameters with its private key. The RSA key is only used to sign, so it does not weaken [forward secrecy](https://ssl.sh/glossary/forward-secrecy/). Publicly trusted CAs issue RSA certificates with keys of at least 2048 bits.

Encryption: [3DES](https://ssl.sh/glossary/3des/) (Triple DES, EDE) in CBC mode. Meet-in-the-middle attacks reduce its nominal 168-bit key to about 112 bits of security, and its 64-bit block is the real problem: [Sweet32](https://ssl.sh/glossary/sweet32/) (CVE-2016-2183, Bhargavan and Leurent, 2016) recovered an HTTP cookie after capturing about 785 GB on one long-lived connection, because block collisions become likely after roughly 2^32 blocks. NIST disallowed Triple DES for encryption after 2023.

Mode: CBC with MAC-then-encrypt. TLS 1.2 and earlier compute the HMAC over the plaintext, then pad and encrypt, so a receiver has to decrypt before it can check integrity. That ordering produced a long run of padding-oracle attacks: [BEAST](https://ssl.sh/glossary/beast/) (CVE-2011-3389) against TLS 1.0's predictable IVs, Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169, 2013), which times the MAC check, and [POODLE](https://ssl.sh/glossary/poodle/) (CVE-2014-3566, 2014) against SSL 3.0's unchecked padding. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022) says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless the encrypt_then_mac extension ([RFC 7366](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7366)) is also negotiated.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA1. [SHA-1](https://ssl.sh/glossary/sha-1/) collisions are practical (SHAttered, 2017), but HMAC does not rely on collision resistance, so HMAC-SHA1 record MACs are not considered broken; this suite's weak points lie elsewhere. When TLS 1.2 is negotiated, keys are derived with the SHA-256 PRF, which [RFC 5246](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246) (2008) applies to every cipher suite defined before it.

## Why this rating

- Uses 3DES, a 64-bit block cipher vulnerable to the Sweet32 birthday attack (CVE-2016-2183).

## Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Implemented | cipher string `ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA`; listed in the OpenSSL 3.5 manual, not enabled in our test build |
| GnuTLS | Implemented | name `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1`; minimum protocol `SSL 3.0` |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | - |
| Go crypto/tls | Supported, off by default | returned by tls.InsecureCipherSuites(); must be listed in Config.CipherSuites |
| NSS 3.133 | Supported, off by default | NSS library default |
| Firefox | Not supported | - |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Supported, off by default | blocked by “`3DES_EDE_CBC`” in the default jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | - |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported | - |

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. Supported but off by default in: Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133 and Java 21 (SunJSSE). Also implemented by: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

- [BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main)](https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/main/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/defaults.go) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox)](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — TAG-INFO](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/TAG-INFO) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/oracle-providers.html#GUID-7093246A-31A3-4304-AC5F-5FB6400405E2) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/java-secure-socket-extension-jsse-reference-guide.html) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-11) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-server-2022) (2026-11-10)
- [docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider)](https://docs.rs/rustls/0.23.46/src/rustls/crypto/aws_lc_rs/mod.rs.html) (2026-11-10)

## History and standards status

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xC0,0x12) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with [RFC 8422](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8422), “Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier” (August 2018, Standards Track) as its specification. RFC 8422 has since been obsoleted by [RFC 9846](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846) (2026). [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate suites using algorithms with less than 128 bits of security, and counts 3DES at 112 bits. The registry marks it N, which per [RFC 8447](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8447) (2018) means it either hasn't been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability or is meant only for specific use cases, not necessarily that it is flawed.

## Nginx / Apache

Disable

```nginx
ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA';
```

```apache
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
```


## How to test whether a server accepts it

Offer only TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA with openssl s_client; if the handshake completes, the server accepts it:

```bash
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_2 -cipher ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA </dev/null
```

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA in its output:

```bash
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
```

To decode a name or hex code, use the [cipher suite lookup](https://ssl.sh/tools/cipher-suite-lookup/); the [SSL checker](https://ssl.sh/tools/ssl-checker/) shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

## FAQ

### Is TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA secure?

No. ssl.sh rates it insecure. Uses 3DES, a 64-bit block cipher vulnerable to the Sweet32 birthday attack (CVE-2016-2183). [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate suites using algorithms with less than 128 bits of security, and counts 3DES at 112 bits.

### Can TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA works with TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256](https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-aes-128-gcm-sha256/), which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

### How do I disable TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA in Nginx or Apache?

Exclude it by its OpenSSL name: append `!ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA` to `ssl_ciphers` in Nginx or to `SSLCipherSuite` in Apache httpd. Listing only the suites you want, as in the snippet above, works even better. Reload the server and repeat the openssl s_client test to confirm the handshake now fails.

### Which clients and libraries still support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA?

Only after explicit configuration: Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133 and Java 21 (SunJSSE). Implemented, default state not tracked here: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS. Not supported: BoringSSL, Firefox, Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.