# TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA cipher suite

> TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xC0,0x33): ECDHE/PSK · RC4-128 · TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. ssl.sh rating: Insecure. OpenSSL/GnuTLS names and Nginx/Apache config.

Source: https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-ecdhe-psk-with-rc4-128-sha/
Last updated: 2026-11-10

TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xC0,0x33) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2: ECDHE key exchange, PSK authentication, RC4-128 encryption and SHA1 message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Insecure.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IANA | TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA |
| Hex code | 0xC0,0x33 |
| OpenSSL | ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA |
| GnuTLS | TLS_ECDHE_PSK_ARCFOUR_128_SHA1 |
| Key exchange | ECDHE |
| Authentication | PSK |
| Encryption | RC4-128 |
| MAC | SHA1 |
| TLS versions | TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 |
| Rating | Insecure |
| IANA "Recommended" | D |
| References | RFC 5489, RFC 6347, RFC 9847 |

## What each component means

A [cipher suite](https://ssl.sh/glossary/cipher-suite/) names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA combines ECDHE key exchange, PSK authentication, RC4-128 encryption and SHA1 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see [how cipher suites work](https://ssl.sh/learn/cipher-suites/).

Key exchange: ECDHE_PSK. A [pre-shared key](https://ssl.sh/glossary/psk/) authenticates the peers and an ephemeral [ECDHE](https://ssl.sh/glossary/ecdhe/) share is combined with it, giving [forward secrecy](https://ssl.sh/glossary/forward-secrecy/) without certificates. The first ECDHE_PSK suites came in [RFC 5489](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5489) (2009); AES-GCM and AES-CCM versions for TLS 1.2 followed in [RFC 8442](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8442) (2018).

Encryption: [RC4](https://ssl.sh/glossary/rc4/), a stream cipher whose keystream is measurably biased. AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt showed in 2013 that a secret such as a cookie can be recovered from enough encryptions of it, and [RFC 7465](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7465) (2015) then prohibited RC4 suites outright: clients MUST NOT offer them and servers MUST NOT select them.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA1. [SHA-1](https://ssl.sh/glossary/sha-1/) collisions are practical (SHAttered, 2017), but HMAC does not rely on collision resistance, so HMAC-SHA1 record MACs are not considered broken; this suite's weak points lie elsewhere. When TLS 1.2 is negotiated, keys are derived with the SHA-256 PRF, which [RFC 5246](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246) (2008) applies to every cipher suite defined before it.

## Why this rating

- Uses RC4, which RFC 7465 prohibits in all TLS versions because of practical biases in its keystream.

## Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Implemented | cipher string `ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA`; listed in the OpenSSL 3.5 manual, not enabled in our test build |
| GnuTLS | Implemented | name `TLS_ECDHE_PSK_ARCFOUR_128_SHA1`; minimum protocol `SSL 3.0` |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | - |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | - |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | - |
| Firefox | Not supported | - |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | - |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | - |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported | - |

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. Also implemented by: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

- [BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main)](https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/main/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/defaults.go) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox)](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — TAG-INFO](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/TAG-INFO) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/oracle-providers.html#GUID-7093246A-31A3-4304-AC5F-5FB6400405E2) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/java-secure-socket-extension-jsse-reference-guide.html) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-11) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-server-2022) (2026-11-10)
- [docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider)](https://docs.rs/rustls/0.23.46/src/rustls/crypto/aws_lc_rs/mod.rs.html) (2026-11-10)

## History and standards status

TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xC0,0x33) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with [RFC 5489](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5489), “ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (March 2009, Informational) as its specification. DTLS 1.2 ([RFC 6347](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6347), January 2012) had already said RC4 MUST NOT be used with DTLS. [RFC 7465](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7465) (2015) prohibits RC4 cipher suites in every TLS version: clients MUST NOT offer them and servers MUST NOT select them. The registry marks it D (discouraged), a value introduced by [RFC 9847](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9847) (2025).

## Nginx / Apache

Disable

```nginx
ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA';
```

```apache
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA
```


## How to test whether a server accepts it

Offer only TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA with openssl s_client; if the handshake completes, the server accepts it:

```bash
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_2 -cipher ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA </dev/null
```

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA in its output:

```bash
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
```

To decode a name or hex code, use the [cipher suite lookup](https://ssl.sh/tools/cipher-suite-lookup/); the [SSL checker](https://ssl.sh/tools/ssl-checker/) shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

## FAQ

### Is TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA secure?

No. ssl.sh rates it insecure. Uses RC4, which RFC 7465 prohibits in all TLS versions because of practical biases in its keystream. [RFC 7465](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7465) (2015) prohibits RC4 cipher suites in every TLS version: clients MUST NOT offer them and servers MUST NOT select them.

### Can TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA works with TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256](https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-aes-128-gcm-sha256/), which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

### How do I disable TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA in Nginx or Apache?

Exclude it by its OpenSSL name: append `!ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA` to `ssl_ciphers` in Nginx or to `SSLCipherSuite` in Apache httpd. Listing only the suites you want, as in the snippet above, works even better. Reload the server and repeat the openssl s_client test to confirm the handshake now fails.

### Which clients and libraries still support TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA?

Implemented, default state not tracked here: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS. Not supported: BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.