# TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite

> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xC0,0x86): ECDHE/ECDSA · Camellia-128-GCM · TLS 1.2. ssl.sh rating: Secure. OpenSSL/GnuTLS names and Nginx/Apache config.

Source: https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-ecdhe-ecdsa-with-camellia-128-gcm-sha256/
Last updated: 2026-11-10

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xC0,0x86) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.2: ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA authentication, Camellia-128-GCM encryption and AEAD message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Secure.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IANA | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Hex code | 0xC0,0x86 |
| OpenSSL | Not available in OpenSSL 3.5 |
| GnuTLS | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 |
| Key exchange | ECDHE |
| Authentication | ECDSA |
| Encryption | Camellia-128-GCM |
| MAC | AEAD |
| TLS versions | TLS 1.2 |
| Rating | Secure |
| IANA "Recommended" | N |
| References | RFC 6367 |

## What each component means

A [cipher suite](https://ssl.sh/glossary/cipher-suite/) names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 combines ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA authentication, Camellia-128-GCM encryption and AEAD integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see [how cipher suites work](https://ssl.sh/learn/cipher-suites/).

Key exchange: [ECDHE](https://ssl.sh/glossary/ecdhe/), ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman. Client and server create a fresh key pair on a named curve such as X25519 or P-256 for every handshake and discard it afterwards. Because the session keys never depend on the server's long-term private key alone, stealing that key later does not decrypt recorded traffic; this property is [forward secrecy](https://ssl.sh/glossary/forward-secrecy/). ECC cipher suites were first specified in [RFC 4492](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492) (2006); the current definition is [RFC 8422](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8422) (2018).

Authentication: [ECDSA](https://ssl.sh/glossary/ecdsa/). The server needs an elliptic-curve certificate, usually P-256 or P-384, and signs the key-exchange parameters with it. A P-256 key gives about 128-bit security, comparable to a 3072-bit RSA key at a fraction of the size, and [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022) recommends P-256 for ECDSA in TLS. A server with only an RSA certificate cannot negotiate this suite, which is why many sites deploy an RSA and an ECDSA certificate side by side.

Encryption: Camellia with a 128-bit key, a 128-bit block cipher designed in 2000 by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric and adopted by Japan's CRYPTREC and ISO/IEC 18033-3. It is considered as strong as AES but rarely has hardware acceleration, so few clients offer it. TLS suites arrived in [RFC 4132](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4132) (2005), replaced by [RFC 5932](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5932) (2010), with GCM variants in [RFC 6367](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6367) (2011).

Mode: GCM (Galois/Counter Mode), an [AEAD](https://ssl.sh/glossary/aead/): counter-mode encryption plus a GHASH authenticator with a 16-byte tag, checked in one step, so the CBC padding attacks don't apply. In TLS 1.2 the 12-byte nonce is a 4-byte implicit salt from the key block plus an 8-byte explicit part sent with every record, as first specified for AES-GCM in [RFC 5288](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5288) (2008); a nonce must never repeat under the same key.

Integrity: there is no separate MAC because the AEAD tag authenticates every record. The SHA256 at the end of the name selects the TLS 1.2 PRF hash used to derive keys and compute the Finished messages.

## Why this rating

- Ephemeral key exchange (forward secrecy) plus an AEAD cipher, the combination TLS 1.2 best practice asks for.

## Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Not supported | - |
| GnuTLS | Implemented | name `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256`; minimum protocol `TLS 1.2` |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | - |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | - |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | - |
| Firefox | Not supported | - |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | - |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | - |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported | - |

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. Also implemented by: GnuTLS.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

- [BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main)](https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/main/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/defaults.go) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox)](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — TAG-INFO](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/TAG-INFO) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/oracle-providers.html#GUID-7093246A-31A3-4304-AC5F-5FB6400405E2) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/java-secure-socket-extension-jsse-reference-guide.html) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-11) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-server-2022) (2026-11-10)
- [docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider)](https://docs.rs/rustls/0.23.46/src/rustls/crypto/aws_lc_rs/mod.rs.html) (2026-11-10)

## History and standards status

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xC0,0x86) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with [RFC 6367](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6367), “Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (September 2011, Informational) as its specification. The registry marks it N, which per [RFC 8447](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8447) (2018) means it either hasn't been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability or is meant only for specific use cases, not necessarily that it is flawed.

## How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 in its output:

```bash
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
```

To decode a name or hex code, use the [cipher suite lookup](https://ssl.sh/tools/cipher-suite-lookup/); the [SSL checker](https://ssl.sh/tools/ssl-checker/) shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

## FAQ

### Is TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 secure?

Cryptographically, yes: ssl.sh rates it secure. Ephemeral key exchange (forward secrecy) plus an AEAD cipher, the combination TLS 1.2 best practice asks for.

### Can TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 works with TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256](https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-aes-128-gcm-sha256/), which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

### How do I disable TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 in Nginx or Apache?

There is nothing to disable: OpenSSL 3.5, which Nginx and Apache httpd normally use, does not implement TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, so they cannot negotiate it.

### Which clients and libraries still support TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256?

Implemented, default state not tracked here: GnuTLS. Not supported: OpenSSL 3.5, BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.