# TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 cipher suite

> TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xC0,0x8D): ECDH/RSA · Camellia-256-GCM · TLS 1.2. ssl.sh rating: Weak. OpenSSL/GnuTLS names and Nginx/Apache config.

Source: https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-ecdh-rsa-with-camellia-256-gcm-sha384/
Last updated: 2026-11-10

TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xC0,0x8D) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.2: ECDH key exchange, RSA authentication, Camellia-256-GCM encryption and AEAD message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Weak.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IANA | TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 |
| Hex code | 0xC0,0x8D |
| OpenSSL | Not available in OpenSSL 3.5 |
| GnuTLS | - |
| Key exchange | ECDH |
| Authentication | RSA |
| Encryption | Camellia-256-GCM |
| MAC | AEAD |
| TLS versions | TLS 1.2 |
| Rating | Weak |
| IANA "Recommended" | D |
| References | RFC 6367, RFC 10015 |

## What each component means

A [cipher suite](https://ssl.sh/glossary/cipher-suite/) names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 combines ECDH key exchange, RSA authentication, Camellia-256-GCM encryption and AEAD integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see [how cipher suites work](https://ssl.sh/learn/cipher-suites/).

Key exchange: static ECDH. The server's elliptic-curve DH key is fixed in its certificate, so there is no [forward secrecy](https://ssl.sh/glossary/forward-secrecy/), and a server that reuses one ECDH key without validating the client's point is open to invalid-curve attacks (Jager, Schwenk and Somorovsky, 2015). The RSA in the name is the algorithm the CA used to sign the ECDH certificate, not a signature made during the handshake.

Encryption: Camellia with a 256-bit key, a 128-bit block cipher designed in 2000 by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric and adopted by Japan's CRYPTREC and ISO/IEC 18033-3. It is considered as strong as AES but rarely has hardware acceleration, so few clients offer it. TLS suites arrived in [RFC 4132](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4132) (2005), replaced by [RFC 5932](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5932) (2010), with GCM variants in [RFC 6367](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6367) (2011).

Mode: GCM (Galois/Counter Mode), an [AEAD](https://ssl.sh/glossary/aead/): counter-mode encryption plus a GHASH authenticator with a 16-byte tag, checked in one step, so the CBC padding attacks don't apply. In TLS 1.2 the 12-byte nonce is a 4-byte implicit salt from the key block plus an 8-byte explicit part sent with every record, as first specified for AES-GCM in [RFC 5288](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5288) (2008); a nonce must never repeat under the same key.

Integrity: there is no separate MAC because the AEAD tag authenticates every record. The SHA384 at the end of the name selects the TLS 1.2 PRF hash used to derive keys and compute the Finished messages.

## Why this rating

- No forward secrecy: the session keys are protected by the server's long-term key (static RSA/DH/ECDH, PSK or Kerberos), so a leaked key decrypts recorded traffic.

## Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Not supported | - |
| GnuTLS | Not supported | - |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | - |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | - |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | - |
| Firefox | Not supported | - |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | - |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | - |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported | - |

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. None of them implements it.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

- [BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main)](https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/main/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/defaults.go) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox)](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — TAG-INFO](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/TAG-INFO) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/oracle-providers.html#GUID-7093246A-31A3-4304-AC5F-5FB6400405E2) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/java-secure-socket-extension-jsse-reference-guide.html) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-11) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-server-2022) (2026-11-10)
- [docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider)](https://docs.rs/rustls/0.23.46/src/rustls/crypto/aws_lc_rs/mod.rs.html) (2026-11-10)

## History and standards status

TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xC0,0x8D) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with [RFC 6367](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6367), “Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)” (September 2011, Informational) as its specification. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate static DH or ECDH key agreement because neither has forward secrecy. [RFC 10015](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10015) (2026) also says clients SHOULD NOT offer and servers SHOULD NOT select non-ephemeral ECDH suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

## How to test whether a server accepts it

OpenSSL 3.5 cannot offer TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, so openssl s_client can't test it directly; use a scanner that implements the suite itself.

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 in its output:

```bash
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
```

To decode a name or hex code, use the [cipher suite lookup](https://ssl.sh/tools/cipher-suite-lookup/); the [SSL checker](https://ssl.sh/tools/ssl-checker/) shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

## FAQ

### Is TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 secure?

Only with caveats: ssl.sh rates it weak. No forward secrecy: the session keys are protected by the server's long-term key (static RSA/DH/ECDH, PSK or Kerberos), so a leaked key decrypts recorded traffic. [RFC 10015](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10015) (2026) also says clients SHOULD NOT offer and servers SHOULD NOT select non-ephemeral ECDH suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

### Can TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 works with TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256](https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-aes-128-gcm-sha256/), which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

### How do I disable TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 in Nginx or Apache?

There is nothing to disable: OpenSSL 3.5, which Nginx and Apache httpd normally use, does not implement TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, so they cannot negotiate it.

### Which clients and libraries still support TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384?

Not supported: OpenSSL 3.5, GnuTLS, BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.