# TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 cipher suite

> TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x00,0xBD): DHE/DSS · Camellia-128-CBC · TLS 1.2. ssl.sh rating: Weak. OpenSSL/GnuTLS names and Nginx/Apache config.

Source: https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-dhe-dss-with-camellia-128-cbc-sha256/
Last updated: 2026-11-10

TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x00,0xBD) is a cipher suite for TLS 1.2: DHE key exchange, DSS authentication, Camellia-128-CBC encryption and SHA256 message authentication. ssl.sh rates it Weak.

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IANA | TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 |
| Hex code | 0x00,0xBD |
| OpenSSL | DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256 |
| GnuTLS | TLS_DHE_DSS_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 |
| Key exchange | DHE |
| Authentication | DSS |
| Encryption | Camellia-128-CBC |
| MAC | SHA256 |
| TLS versions | TLS 1.2 |
| Rating | Weak |
| IANA "Recommended" | D |
| References | RFC 5932, RFC 10015 |

## What each component means

A [cipher suite](https://ssl.sh/glossary/cipher-suite/) names the algorithms a client and server agree on in one handshake. TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 combines DHE key exchange, DSS authentication, Camellia-128-CBC encryption and SHA256 integrity protection. Each part is explained below with its known weaknesses; for the bigger picture see [how cipher suites work](https://ssl.sh/learn/cipher-suites/).

Key exchange: DHE, ephemeral finite-field [Diffie-Hellman](https://ssl.sh/glossary/diffie-hellman/). A new DH key pair per handshake gives [forward secrecy](https://ssl.sh/glossary/forward-secrecy/), but in TLS 1.2 the server alone picks the group and the client cannot ask for a stronger one; [RFC 7919](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7919) (2016) added negotiated FFDHE groups, which saw little uptake. [Logjam](https://ssl.sh/glossary/logjam/) (CVE-2015-4000, 2015) broke servers that still accepted 512-bit export groups and showed that huge numbers of sites shared the same few 1024-bit primes, and the Raccoon timing attack (2020) exploits how TLS 1.2 strips leading zero bytes from the DH secret. Those are the reasons [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022) gives for telling TLS 1.2 implementations not to negotiate TLS_DHE_* suites.

Authentication: DSS, meaning DSA certificates. Publicly trusted CAs only issue RSA and ECDSA certificates under the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, TLS 1.3 has no DSA signature scheme, and NIST's FIPS 186-5 (2023) no longer approves DSA for creating signatures, so DSS suites only survive in legacy private PKIs.

Encryption: Camellia with a 128-bit key, a 128-bit block cipher designed in 2000 by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric and adopted by Japan's CRYPTREC and ISO/IEC 18033-3. It is considered as strong as AES but rarely has hardware acceleration, so few clients offer it. TLS suites arrived in [RFC 4132](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4132) (2005), replaced by [RFC 5932](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5932) (2010), with GCM variants in [RFC 6367](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6367) (2011).

Mode: CBC with MAC-then-encrypt. TLS 1.2 and earlier compute the HMAC over the plaintext, then pad and encrypt, so a receiver has to decrypt before it can check integrity. That ordering produced a long run of padding-oracle attacks: [BEAST](https://ssl.sh/glossary/beast/) (CVE-2011-3389) against TLS 1.0's predictable IVs, Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169, 2013), which times the MAC check, and [POODLE](https://ssl.sh/glossary/poodle/) (CVE-2014-3566, 2014) against SSL 3.0's unchecked padding. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022) says CBC suites SHOULD NOT be used unless the encrypt_then_mac extension ([RFC 7366](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7366)) is also negotiated.

Integrity: HMAC-SHA256 over each record, computed before encryption (MAC-then-encrypt). In TLS 1.2 the SHA256 in the name also selects the PRF hash. Because of that, the suite needs TLS 1.2 and cannot be used with older versions.

## Why this rating

- CBC mode with a separate MAC (MAC-then-encrypt), the construction behind padding-oracle attacks such as Lucky Thirteen; prefer an AEAD cipher.

## Which TLS libraries support it

Support for TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 as read from each library's own source code or official documentation on 2026-11-10. “Enabled by default” means the library negotiates it with no configuration; “off by default” means it is implemented but has to be switched on.

| Library | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| OpenSSL 3.5 | Implemented | cipher string `DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256` |
| GnuTLS | Implemented | name `TLS_DHE_DSS_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256`; minimum protocol `TLS 1.2` |
| BoringSSL | Not supported | - |
| Go crypto/tls | Not supported | - |
| NSS 3.133 | Not supported | - |
| Firefox | Not supported | - |
| Java 21 (SunJSSE) | Not supported | - |
| Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) | Not supported | - |
| rustls 0.23.46 | Not supported | - |

None of the 9 libraries tracked here enables it by default. Also implemented by: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS.

NSS shows the library's own defaults; Firefox switches every NSS suite off at start-up and re-enables only those with a security.ssl3.* or security.tls13.* preference. Java defaults are derived from the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms value Oracle documents for JDK 21, which later updates may extend. The OpenSSL and GnuTLS rows only show whether the suite is implemented.

- [BoringSSL — ssl/ssl_cipher.cc (main)](https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/refs/heads/main/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go) (2026-11-10)
- [Go — src/crypto/tls/defaults.go (master)](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/crypto/tls/defaults.go) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — lib/ssl/ssl3con.c (as vendored in Firefox)](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c) (2026-11-10)
- [NSS — TAG-INFO](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/nss/TAG-INFO) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSComponent.cpp) (2026-11-10)
- [Firefox — modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml](https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/blob/main/modules/libpref/init/StaticPrefList.yaml) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 Providers Documentation: SunJSSE Cipher Suites](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/oracle-providers.html#GUID-7093246A-31A3-4304-AC5F-5FB6400405E2) (2026-11-10)
- [Oracle — JDK 21 JSSE Reference Guide: jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/21/security/java-secure-socket-extension-jsse-reference-guide.html) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows 11](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-11) (2026-11-10)
- [Microsoft Learn — TLS Cipher Suites in Windows Server 2022](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/tls-cipher-suites-in-windows-server-2022) (2026-11-10)
- [docs.rs — rustls 0.23.46 crypto::aws_lc_rs (default provider)](https://docs.rs/rustls/0.23.46/src/rustls/crypto/aws_lc_rs/mod.rs.html) (2026-11-10)

## History and standards status

TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x00,0xBD) is registered in the IANA TLS Cipher Suites registry with [RFC 5932](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5932), “Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS” (June 2010, Standards Track) as its specification. [RFC 9325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325) (2022), part of BCP 195, says TLS 1.2 implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS_DHE_* suites, citing the Raccoon attack and the poor uptake of negotiated groups. [RFC 10015](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10015) (2026) now says clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

## Nginx / Apache

Disable

```nginx
ssl_ciphers 'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256';
```

```apache
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
```


## How to test whether a server accepts it

Offer only TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 with openssl s_client; if the handshake completes, the server accepts it:

```bash
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -tls1_2 -cipher DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256 </dev/null
```

nmap's ssl-enum-ciphers script connects repeatedly, trying one suite at a time, and lists every suite the server accepts with a grade from A to F. Look for TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 in its output:

```bash
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 example.com
```

To decode a name or hex code, use the [cipher suite lookup](https://ssl.sh/tools/cipher-suite-lookup/); the [SSL checker](https://ssl.sh/tools/ssl-checker/) shows which protocol versions a live server accepts and the cipher suite it negotiates.

## FAQ

### Is TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 secure?

Only with caveats: ssl.sh rates it weak. CBC mode with a separate MAC (MAC-then-encrypt), the construction behind padding-oracle attacks such as Lucky Thirteen; prefer an AEAD cipher. [RFC 10015](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10015) (2026) now says clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE suites in (D)TLS 1.2, and IANA changed this entry's Recommended value to D.

### Can TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 be used with TLS 1.3?

No. TLS 1.3 has its own suites that name only the AEAD and the hash, and TLS 1.2 suites can't be used in a TLS 1.3 handshake. TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 works with TLS 1.2. The closest TLS 1.3 suite is [TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256](https://ssl.sh/ciphers/tls-aes-128-gcm-sha256/), which TLS 1.3 combines with a separately negotiated key exchange such as X25519.

### How do I disable TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 in Nginx or Apache?

Exclude it by its OpenSSL name: append `!DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256` to `ssl_ciphers` in Nginx or to `SSLCipherSuite` in Apache httpd. Listing only the suites you want, as in the snippet above, works even better. Reload the server and repeat the openssl s_client test to confirm the handshake now fails.

### Which clients and libraries still support TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256?

Implemented, default state not tracked here: OpenSSL 3.5 and GnuTLS. Not supported: BoringSSL, Go crypto/tls, NSS 3.133, Firefox, Java 21 (SunJSSE), Windows Schannel (Windows 11 / Server 2022) and rustls 0.23.46.